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Abstract 
Furthering our understanding of children’s memory mechanisms will expand our knowledge 
of ways to reduce false memory errors. Hege and Dodson (2004) found that adult participants 
who studied pictures later recalled items more accurately than participants who studied words. 
This demonstrated that encoding information in a distinctive manner can reduce false 
memories. The main aim of the present study was to explore whether using distinctive 
information within the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm can reduce false memories in 
children (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Two hundred and forty-three eleven-
year-old children (mean age 11.5) studied pictures and words on a screen, each with an 
accompanying aural label. In contrast to the findings of Hege and Dodson, studying pictures 
did not reduce false memories in these participants. There were no significant encoding 
differences between children who studied pictures and children who studied words, as 
measured by the rate of falsely recalled non-presented critical lure words. Moreover, the 
children’s average rate of recall of the false memories was very low (19.6%). This is just over 
half the rate reported by Hege and Dodson with adult subjects. On the other hand, 
manipulation of the test instructions at retrieval had a significant effect on the rate of recall of 
critical lures. Each group of participants received different retrieval instructions. As expected, 
the highest numbers of recalled critical lures occurred when subjects were asked to report 
studied items as well as related items (inclusion recall instructions). This study demonstrated 
the complex role of encoding and retrieval mechanisms in older children’s memory processes, 
and showed that children do not appear to reduce false memories in a manner that is 
consistent with adults. The results are discussed in terms of children’s processing of pictures 
and words, eleven-year-olds’ semantic development, and links to fuzzy-trace theory. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Researchers have explored how encoding and retrieval manipulations can reduce the level of 
false memories generated by adults. False memories arise when people remember events that 
never happened or remember them differently from the way that they occurred (Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995). As false memories can have serious implications in practice (e.g., sexual 
abuse claims have later been proved false, and innocent people have been convicted of crimes 
they did not commit), it is vital to further our understanding of memory mechanisms and the 
processes which can lead to the reduction of false memories in children. 
 
There has been a recent surge of interest in false memories using word lists after Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) replicated and extended the work of Deese (1959). This paradigm became 
known as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (or DRM) whereby a critical non-
presented lure word is associated with a group of words presented at study. Research has 
shown that these critical lure words are falsely recalled and recognised at high levels (for a 
review see Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). In the present study, remembrance 
of a critical non-presented lure word equates to a false memory effect. By varying the 
presentation of words with other kinds of information such as pictures, researchers have 
shown how these encoding manipulations can reduce false memories within the DRM 
paradigm (e.g., Israel & Schacter, 1997). For example, Hege and Dodson (2004) found that 
studying pictures compared to words reduced false memories in adults, demonstrating the 
effect of an encoding manipulation. They found that critical lures were less likely to be 
reported after picture encoding than after word encoding, which they interpret as supporting a 
particular encoding account (known as the impoverished relational-encoding account) and a 
particular retrieval account (known as the distinctiveness heuristic account). These two 
accounts explain why studying distinctive information reduces false memories in adults. 
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According to the impoverished relational-encoding account, distinctive information is thought 
to interfere with the processing of relational information during the initial encoding of study 
items, leading to reduced false memories. In contrast, the distinctiveness heuristic account 
explains how false memories can be reduced as a result of the use of a specific retrieval 
strategy. If people fail to remember distinctive information which they feel they ought to 
remember, such absence of memory is taken as evidence that the event never occurred. The 
distinctiveness heuristic reduces false memories by using ‘failing to remember’ signals to 
indicate that the test item is new (Dodson, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 2000).  Words do not share 
access to such distinctive information, which leads participants to judge word items as ‘old’ 
and produce more false memory errors. To date, most studies in this area have focused on 
how adults can reduce false memories following the presentation of distinctive information 
within the DRM paradigm (e.g., Israel & Schacter, 1997; Dodson & Schacter, 2001). In 
contrast, the current study will explore whether distinctive information reduces false 
memories in children in line with the encoding and retrieval accounts described above. 
 
Older children have demonstrated differences in false memory recall rates in comparison to 
adults and younger children. For example, in Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest’s (2002) study 
with word lists, the researchers found that eleven-year-olds’ false recall rates were higher than 
those of 5- and 7-year-old children but still only half the level of adults’ rates. The current 
study focuses on eleven-year-old children (mean age 11.5 years) to examine this difference in 
older children’s susceptibility to false memory errors, and further our understanding of their 
memory processes in the study of distinctive information. By this age, children are thought to 
have completed their developmental shift from phonological to semantic processing 
(Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004).  
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The main aim of the present study was to explore whether using distinctive information can 
reduce false memories in children. Half of the participants studied pictures while the other 
half studied words. Both the pictures and words used originated from the word lists in the 
DRM paradigm. The retrieval instructions were manipulated to explore whether children 
would reduce false memories in line with the impoverished relational-encoding account and 
the distinctiveness heuristic account. In this manner, the study explored whether children 
would demonstrate reduced false memories in a way that was consistent with adults, as 
reported by Hege and Dodson (2004). 
 
In addition to testing the encoding effect of varying pictures and words, the current study also 
explored the effect of retrieval manipulations on children’s abilities to reduce false memories 
within the DRM paradigm. In particular, ‘inclusion’ recall instructions were implemented in 
order to explore whether critical lures were reported less often after picture encoding than 
after word encoding. Inclusion recall instructions involved subjects reporting as many studied 
items as they could plus any related items. After they had completed their recall task they 
were then instructed to go through their reported items and place a tick next to those that were 
actually presented during study. According to the impoverished relational-encoding account, 
critical lures are less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than after word encoding 
for participants given inclusion recall instructions. In order to explore whether the children in 
the study would use the distinctiveness heuristic as a retrieval strategy, ‘standard recall’ 
instructions and ‘specific recall’ instructions were implemented in addition to inclusion recall 
instructions. Participants given standard recall instructions were to recall as many study items 
as they could remember. Those given specific instructions were asked to recall only study 
items that they could specifically remember being presented on the projector screen. The 
distinctiveness heuristic account predicts a larger difference between encoding conditions 
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under standard recall instructions than under inclusion recall instructions. Hege and Dodson 
(2004) only found support for the distinctiveness heuristic in their post-recall recognition test, 
where participants in the inclusion recall instruction condition went through their words and 
placed a tick next to words they remembered seeing at study. In order to explore whether the 
distinctiveness heuristic might be applied at recall, the current study created an additional 
instruction condition, where participants were asked to write down only the specific stimuli 
that they saw on the projector screen (specific instructions).  
 
Before addressing all of these specific issues, however, the first section provides a more 
general overview of the literature relating to false memories and the DRM paradigm. The 
second section describes the rapidly evolving literature on how false memories can be 
reduced. The third section examines how distinctive information can reduce false memories, 
including a closer examination of the impoverished relational-encoding account and the 
distinctiveness heuristic account to explain why distinctive information reduces false 
memories in adults. The final section examines research involving children’s potential to 
reduce false memories in terms of 1) their susceptibility, 2) the age group selected, and 3) the 
influence of distinctive information. 
 
1.1 False Memories and the DRM paradigm 
Memory is prone to error due to its reconstructive nature. It is influenced by the way people 
retrieve memory in pieces over time rather than as a whole entity (Hyman & Pentland, 1996; 
Braun-LaTour, LaTour, Pickrell, & Loftus, 2004). Baddeley (2001) notes that memory 
involves encoding, storing, and retrieving information. People can create memories using the 
information from memory in combination with other related knowledge, rather than retrieving 
a memory as a whole entity (Hyman & Pentland, 1996). According to Bartlett (1932), 
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memory gives meaning to our experiences, shaped by previous experience and what we 
learned from it (Bartlett, 1932; Braun-LaTour et al., 2004). Bartlett also notes that memory is 
vulnerable to human error, mixing fact with interpretation until they are indistinguishable. 
The reconstructive nature of memory can lead people to claim to remember false memories. 
 
1.1.1 Defining False Memories 
Memories can be changed or created by our imaginations, by leading questions, and by other 
people’s recollections of the same events. The false memory phenomenon has been 
demonstrated by observations which show how a true event was remembered but in a 
mistaken way (for review see Loftus, 1997). For example, the memory of a story was 
distorted after multiple retellings, and remembered word lists could include words that were 
not studied, but which were related to the words on the list. 
 
False memories can be defined as “either remembering events that never happened, or 
remembering them quite differently from the way they happened” (Roediger & McDermott, 
1995, p.803).  They can occur when people believe they have experienced an event, although 
in fact they have not (Dodson et al., 2000). The way information is presented to us and how 
our decision-making processes interpret it can affect how accurately we attribute the source of 
our memories. This can make us more prone to making memory errors (Payne, Neuschatz, 
Lampinen, & Lynn, 1997). Roediger defines such errors as “cases in which a rememberer’s 
report of a past event seriously deviates from the event’s actual occurrence” (Roediger, 1996, 
p.76). Memory distortions are of concern, as they can cause us to question the reliability and 
accuracy of our past memories (Dodson, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 2000).  
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1.1.2 Suggestibility of memory errors: eyewitness memory research 
Further evidence that memory is reconstructive comes from eyewitness memory research. 
Studies have shown that if people are given misleading post-event information they are likely 
to include this misleading information into their memory of the original event (for review see 
Loftus, 2003). For example, Loftus and Palmer (1974) demonstrated how subjects’ responses 
and perceptions of an event can be influenced by leading questions. After viewing films of an 
automobile accident, subjects were asked questions such as: “About how fast were the cars 
going when they smashed into each other?” This type of question demonstrated higher 
estimates of speed than questions in which the word smashed was replaced with collided, 
bumped, contacted or hit. Further, the subjects who had received the earlier question with the 
verb smashed were later more likely to answer that they had seen broken glass, even though 
there was no broken glass shown in the original event. Loftus and Palmer’s research 
demonstrates what they deemed the ‘misinformation effect’: how people’s recollections can 
become distorted after viewing an event, and then receiving subsequent misleading 
information about that event (Loftus, 1997). As misleading information has been shown to 
influence participants’ memory of original events, it follows that people can recall false or 
inaccurate memories. 
 
1.1.3 The false memory phenomenon 
There is ample evidence of the false memory phenomenon. Even George W. Bush, the 
President of the United States, has succumbed to the false memory effect. On several 
occasions when asked to describe how he heard the news of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, his 
answers contained significant inconsistencies (Greenberg, 2004). This demonstrates how 
inaccurate our memories can be and how susceptible they are to external influences. 
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Researchers have planted false memories as a way of showing the strength of the false 
memory phenomenon. 
 
People have been led to believe that entire childhood events have happened to them, such as 
being lost in a shopping mall, even though these events never occurred (e.g., Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995). This can be achieved through collaboration with family members in order to 
combine actual memories with suggestions from others (Loftus, 1997). Studies such as these 
demonstrate the powerful effect of planting false memories. People can succumb to the false 
memory effect and become convinced that false occurrences were real. 
 
1.1.4 Impossible Memories 
Even stronger evidence for the false memory phenomenon comes from the implantation of 
impossible memories. Braun-LaTour and colleagues demonstrated an impossible memory by 
manipulating an advertisement for Disneyland. Many participants ‘remembered’ seeing Bugs 
Bunny as part of their experience at Disneyland (e.g., Braun-LaTour et al., 2004; Braun, Ellis, 
& Loftus, 2002). This demonstrated the effect of advertising received after an experience, on 
the way an experience is remembered (Braun, 1999; Braun-LaTour et al., 2004). The memory 
which participants described is impossible: Bugs Bunny is a Warner Brothers character and 
would not be found at Disneyland. 
 
1.1.5 The DRM paradigm 
Word lists were used in the present study to demonstrate a false memory effect. As 
background, a seminal study by Deese (1959) provided evidence for false memories, when he 
demonstrated that false recall can occur following the presentation of word lists. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) replicated Deese’s (1959) study, using the lists that Deese had found 
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evoked the most false recall. This extension of Deese’s research and the ability of the design 
to demonstrate false memory errors became recognised as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
paradigm (DRM). Roediger and McDermott (1995) presented subjects with several lists of 
words constructed so that all the words in each list were associated with a critical (non-
presented) word. For example, for the critical word sweet the list words were sour, candy, 
sugar, bitter, good, taste, tooth, nice, honey, soda, chocolate, heart, cake, tart and pie. After 
the subjects had studied the word lists, they were asked to recall the words and often 
mistakenly recalled the non-presented lure words, such as sweet.  
 
Because the present study is directly related to the DRM paradigm, some additional pertinent 
details regarding the two experiments conducted by Roediger and McDermott (1995) are 
given here. In their first experiment the subjects heard and recalled the lists and then 
completed a recognition test on both studied and non-studied items. Roediger and 
McDermott’s research showed that the critical non-presented items such as sweet were 
recalled at about the same level as items actually presented in the middle of the lists. 
 
Their second experiment demonstrated the strength of false memories. Roediger and 
McDermott (1995) found that false recognition responses were frequently made with high 
confidence or were frequently accompanied by ‘remember’ judgments whereby the subject 
claimed to be able to mentally ‘relive’ the experience.  These responses may have occurred 
because the lists contained words that were associated with the critical non-presented words 
or words of similar concepts, and although the critical words were not presented, they were 
the prototypes from which each list was generated. Therefore the lists encouraged schematic 
processing. 
 
 16 
Roediger and McDermott’s experiments highlighted the role of retrieval processes in false 
recall and false recognition. False remembering may arise from repeated attempts at retrieval. 
Subjects in the experiment usually recalled the critical word toward the end of the set of their 
list of recalled items, which suggests that prior recall of related items may trigger false recall.  
 
Roediger and McDermott (1995) found that subjects frequently recalled or recognized the 
critical non-presented items (such as sweet) as having come from the study lists. The DRM 
paradigm elicits high levels of false recall and demonstrates the strength of such false 
memories (Hege & Dodson, 2004). 
 
1.1.6 Summary 
The false memory phenomenon, and the DRM paradigm in particular, demonstrate how 
people can remember words that have never been presented to them. It appears that people 
remember semantically associated words that do not appear to be consciously registered 
(Riegler, 2005). This demonstrates the reconstructive nature of memory, and shows that it can 
be retrieved in fragments and combined with additional related knowledge rather than stored 
as a whole entity. Difficulties in distinguishing between real and possible events have 
important wider practical implications, such as the recovery of memories of child sexual 
abuse. It is therefore essential that we look for ways to reduce the occurrence of false 
memories. 
 
1.2 Reducing False memories 
According to Dodson, Koutstaal, and Schacter (2000), there are two important ways to reduce 
or avoid memory misattributions, involving encoding influences and retrieval influences. 
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The first method involves enhancing the encoding and subsequent recollection of source-
specific information. In the DRM word list paradigm, if individuals are allowed to repeatedly 
study and recall the related presented words, then false memory errors can be reduced. This is 
purportedly due to the greater exposure to the studied words, which provides more 
opportunities to encode the specific features of the individual words on the lists. A decline in 
the false recognition rates could be due to improved memory for the studied words. False 
memories are also reduced when participants encode and later recollect detailed item-specific 
information. Thus within this method, both encoding specific item information and encoding 
information through multiple study test trials can reduce false recognition responses to lure 
items (Dodson et al., 2000).  
 
Another way of reducing false memories is through retrieval influences. Factors such as 
methods of prompting memory can influence the type and amount of information that people 
remember. Changing the format of the memory query appears to affect whether participants 
will make false recognition errors. For example, when people receive ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
instructions (where ‘old’ encompasses a picture that was seen during the study phase, while 
‘new’ refers to a picture that was not seen earlier), they are biased to respond on the basis of 
overall familiarity. A retrieval orientation that promotes a response on the basis of specific 
item information could be a way to reject false memories.  Performance can improve when 
the test response requirements encourage participants to examine memory for source 
information (Dodson et al., 2000).  
 
Dodson et al. state that the effectiveness of the type of retrieval orientation for reducing false 
recognition responses depends on two variables: how individuals evaluate their memories and 
the similarity of the memories to one another. False memories can be reduced when 
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individuals are oriented at retrieval to scrutinize their memory for specific source information 
or other item-specific details (Dodson et al., 2000). 
 
1.2.1. Encoding processes in the reduction of false memories 
Read (1996) noted that the magnitude of the false memory effect has been enhanced or 
diminished by employing certain encoding instructions. For example, when rehearsal 
activities are elaborate and encourage subjects to consider the meaning of the study stimuli 
(e.g., Craik & Lockhart, 1972), participants may be more likely to elicit a critical lure word. 
 
On the other hand, encoding processes can also decrease the availability or likelihood of a 
critical lure or false memory coming to mind at retrieval. For example, Hege and Dodson 
(2004) found evidence for reduced false memories in their participants after studying pictures, 
compared to studying words, which they explain in terms of reduced impoverished encoding 
of relational or associative information.  From this perspective, studying pictures is thought to 
interfere with the encoding of relational information. Fuzzy-trace theory and spreading 
activation theory, explored later in this introduction, can also account for this effect. For now, 
what is clear is that the way that information is presented at study can have a significant effect 
on memory for an event. Also, research has demonstrated that encoding distinctive 
information in the form of pictures compared to words can dramatically reduce the recall of 
false memory errors in adults. This concept of distinctiveness will be described in more detail 
subsequently. The current study manipulates the encoding conditions (pictures vs words) in 
order to explore whether participants studying information as pictures will make fewer errors 
than participants studying words. 
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1.2.2. Retrieval suppression mechanisms in the reduction of false memories 
Retrieval processes can be effective in reducing false memories. When an individual attempts 
to remember information about an event, he or she may adopt some kind of inferential 
strategy. One such strategy is the distinctiveness heuristic, whereby absence of memory for 
distinctive information indicates that a study item is new (Dodson et al., 2000). This 
distinctiveness heuristic may be applied when an individual fails to remember information 
about a past event that he or she is expected to remember. That is, this retrieval strategy 
depends on an individual’s metamemorial beliefs about expected information. It has been 
demonstrated to reduce false memories when individuals reason that if they fail to remember 
expected information then it cannot have occurred (e.g., Dodson & Schacter, 2001).  
Participants who study distinctive pictorial information, for instance, are thought to have 
detailed recollections about the studied items, unlike participants who study words. Moreover, 
those who have encoded pictures are thought to take the absence of memory for this type of 
information of a given picture as an indicator that a test item is new.  
 
Hege and Dodson (2004) note that there are several other similar metacognitive retrieval 
strategies whereby people’s behaviour is guided by the absence of memory for expected 
information (e.g., Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Brown, Buchanan, & Cabeza, 2000; Brown, 
Lewis, & Monk, 1977). One that is similar to the distinctiveness heuristic is a ‘lack of 
knowledge inference’ (Collins, Warnock, Aiello, & Miller, 1975; Gentner & Collins, 1981). 
Gentner and Collins (1981) describe this situation as a ‘metainference’ for ruling out events 
based on the lack of expected knowledge for events. In this inference, failure to find 
information in memory leads to the conclusion that the assertion is false.  
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Some retrieval strategies relate to individuals’ metamemorial beliefs about the source of their 
memories. According to Johnson and colleagues’ source-monitoring framework (SMF), the 
accuracy of memories results from an interaction between activated information and judgment 
processes (Johnson, Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). When characteristics of memories overlap 
from different sources it can be more difficult to attribute them to their original source 
(Mather, Henkel, & Johnson, 1997). Individuals can adopt decision biases based on their 
metamemorial beliefs relating to the memorability of source information. An example is the 
“I’d know if I did it” retrieval bias effect, where memories of actions are confused with 
memories of imagined actions. Anderson (1984) demonstrated that subjects were biased 
toward assuming that actions were more memorable than other activities. This is one of 
several decision biases concerned with individuals’ metamemorial beliefs about the source of 
information (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). 
 
Another retrieval mechanism that is pertinent to mention is the recall-to-reject retrieval 
mechanism, whereby false memories are suppressed, based on remembering specific prior 
events (for a review see Clark & Gronlund, 1996 pp.56-57). From this account, specific 
memorial information leads participants to correctly reject familiar but incorrect items as a 
result of remembering specific information about an earlier event (e.g., Brainerd, Wright, 
Reyna, & Payne, 2002).  Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin (2002) interpreted their own experimental 
findings in terms of recall-to-reject processes: participants who studied words with associated 
pictures, in comparison to participants who studied solely words, were better able to reject 
critical lures. This resulted in reduced false memory errors. 
 
In summary, there are two ways that individuals can edit out or suppress false memories at 
retrieval. The first is by using a retrieval strategy where false memories are ruled out by the 
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absence of expected memorial information. This occurs in the distinctiveness heuristic 
account and the lack of knowledge inference. The second way individuals can reduce false 
memories is by remembering specific memorial information, as, for example, in the recall-to-
reject hypothesis.  
 
1.2.3 Overview of encoding and retrieval processes and relevance to the current study 
The processes undertaken at encoding and retrieval can influence whether false memories are 
evoked. Schacter, Norman, and Koutstaal (1998) provide a review of a constructive memory 
framework (CMF) outlining the processes that operate at encoding and at retrieval. When the 
appropriate conditions of encoding and retrieval are not met, inaccurate memories can arise. 
 
CMF stresses the importance for pattern separation at encoding, declaring it is necessary for 
episodes to be stored in a manner that allows them to be accessed separately at test.  At 
encoding, the features that make up an episode need to be linked together to form a ‘coherent 
representation’. If this feature binding is not coherent, it can lead to source memory failure, 
where people retrieve pieces of an episode but cannot recollect how or when the pieces were 
acquired (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998). 
 
During retrieval, a process of pattern completion occurs, where a subset of the features of the 
past experience is reactivated. The activation is then thought to spread to the other features of 
the experience. According to the CMF, retrieval cues need to be very specific so that they 
activate only single episodes. If this does not occur, then multiple episodes will be activated 
and accessed at the time of test recall, which can result in source confusions and subsequent 
false memories (Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998).  
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The CMF demonstrates the importance of the processes that occur at encoding and retrieval. 
The current study involves encoding items in a distinctive manner in the form of pictures. 
Picture encoding has the potential to decrease activation to related lure words and so 
impoverish the encoding of relational information (Hege & Dodson, 2004).  As discussed 
earlier, a number of retrieval processes can contribute to the reduction in false memories. In 
order to explore the retrieval processes in the current study, a recall test with standard and 
inclusion instructions was employed, inspired by the work of Hege and Dodson (2004), 
Jacoby (1991), Brainerd and Reyna (1998b), and Schacter, Cendan, Dodson, and Clifford, 
(2001). The use of this retrieval manipulation allows examination of the applicability of the 
impoverished relational-encoding account and the distinctiveness heuristic account to the 
retrieval processes of children. 
 
1.3 Why distinctive information reduces false memories in adults: two accounts to explain 
the reduction of false memories  
Distinctive information refers to information that is thought to be encoded in a more 
memorable manner. Several studies have shown how the presentation of distinctive 
information can reduce false memories in adults. Hunt and Einstein (1981, p. 498) define 
distinctiveness as “an inverse function of the number of features in a trace shared by other to-
be-remembered events”. When researchers have varied the encoding manipulations in the 
DRM paradigm so that some participants study items in a more distinctive manner using 
images, false memories have been reduced (Hege & Dodson, 2004). Israel and Schacter 
(1997) demonstrated that when items are studied with pictures in addition to words, the 
number of false recognition errors in the DRM paradigm decreases. Similarly, when words 
are said aloud at encoding, fewer errors have resulted than when words are heard at the time 
of encoding while seeing them (Dodson & Schacter, 2001). Hege and Dodson found that 
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fewer false memory errors occurred after studying information given as pictures as opposed to 
words. This focus on the distinctive properties of the items is thought to have reduced the 
probability of recalling false critical lures (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). 
 
It seems clear that pictures are encoded in a more distinctive manner as opposed to words. 
Hege and Dodson (2004) explored two potential accounts of why false memories are reduced 
when studying pictures using the DRM paradigm. The impoverished relational-encoding 
account and the distinctiveness heuristic account give different explanations for the reduction 
in false memories after the encoding of distinctive information. According to the 
impoverished relational-encoding account, critical lures evoke less memorial information 
after picture encoding than after word encoding. In the distinctiveness heuristic account, on 
the other hand, critical lures are thought to evoke similar amounts of memorial information 
after picture and word encoding, but picture encoding may allow participants to suppress false 
recognition of the critical lures at retrieval. This is achieved by means of a retrieval strategy 
(the distinctiveness heuristic) whereby the absence of memory for expected distinctive 
information is indicative of an event’s non-occurrence. Participants in their study were given 
inclusion instructions to recall studied and other items that were related to what was presented 
in picture-encoding and word-encoding conditions, in order to explore these two accounts. 
The results lent support to the impoverished relational-encoding explanation, whereby critical 
lures are less likely to come to mind after picture encoding than after word encoding. Hege 
and Dodson (2004) found support for the distinctiveness heuristic account from their post-
recall recognition test. This test measured the proportion of studied items and critical lures, 
reported under the inclusion instructions. However, the results from the free-recall test failed 
to support the distinctiveness heuristic account. The following section will further explore 
 24 
these two accounts which have provided potential explanations for reduced false memories in 
adult participants.  
 
1.3.1 The distinctiveness heuristic 
False recognition rates can be influenced by the strategies that people use at retrieval to assess 
or evaluate the remembered information (Dodson et al., 2000). As described above, the 
distinctiveness heuristic is a retrieval strategy which depends on the joint influences of the 
encoding and retrieval stages of memory. The absence of memory for expected information is 
taken as evidence that an event is new. Studying the same items with accompanying pictures 
instead of words alone dramatically reduces false recognition rates in adults (Israel & 
Schacter, 1997). According to the distinctiveness heuristic account, this finding is due to 
different recollective expectations from studying pictures versus words.  Budson et al. (2005) 
suggest that use of the distinctiveness heuristic involves recollection which differentiates 
between item types. Pictorial information can be retrieved in this way, but additional retrieval 
processes are needed to distinguish between item types in verbal information. 
 
Israel and Schacter (1997) were the first to demonstrate the workings of the distinctiveness 
heuristic. According to this account, individuals’ metamemorial beliefs will affect the types of 
memories they feel that they ought to remember. In their experiment, Israel and Schacter 
(1997) found a dramatic reduction in false recognition errors when semantic associates were 
accompanied with pictures, as opposed to conditions when solely words were studied. This 
effect was thought to occur because adult participants studying pictures rejected new words as 
“they lacked the distinctiveness qualities associated with remembered pictures” (Schacter, 
Israel, & Racine, 1999, p. 2). Israel and Schacter (1997) explained that studying pictures is 
thought to result in more distinctive recollections than studying words. These distinctive 
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perceptual representations require a specific recollection of a test item before it is classed as 
old (Israel & Schacter, 1997), leading to more accurate memory for pictorial stimuli. 
 
Individuals feel that they ought to remember distinctive pictorial information and information 
that they have said aloud. Individuals access either the pictorial information or the spoken 
information, and use it as a basis for judging items that have been studied, igniting a 
distinctiveness heuristic (Dodson et al., 2000). If people do not remember distinctive 
information they consider it an indicator that the information is new. Detailed recollections 
are not thought to occur in participants in the word-encoding conditions, where decisions are 
not made on the presence or absence of memory for distinctive information (Dodson et al., 
2000).  
 
Further evidence for reduced false recognition errors after pictorial encoding was provided by 
Dodson and Schacter (2002). After participants studied pictures, words, or a mixture of both 
they undertook a recognition test, which involved studied items that appeared once and new 
items that appeared twice. The researchers found that participants who studied items as 
pictures compared to words or a mixture of both made fewer false recognition errors. This 
was despite the fact that new words were shown to them two or more different times, whereas 
the studied items were only shown once in the recognition test. Results indicated that 
participants in the word-encoding condition were susceptible to falsely recognising repeated 
new words. In contrast, studying pictures produced a reduction in false recognition rates to the 
repeated new words (Dodson & Schacter, 2002).  
 
Dodson and Schacter (2002) also explored the influence of diagnosticity and metacognitive 
control, and their impact on participants’ use of the distinctiveness heuristic. Diagnosticity 
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was investigated by varying the number of study items which appeared as pictures. The 
researchers found a suppression effect, as false recognition was suppressed after pictorial 
encoding as described above. Dodson and Schacter  (2002) concluded that participants were 
less likely to falsely recognize repeated new words when they studied items, as a result of 
evoking a distinctiveness heuristic.  
 
The authors also sought to determine at what level participants would abandon the 
distinctiveness heuristic, and explored how many items need to be distinctive before the 
strategy is invoked (Dodson & Schacter, 2002). Therefore, some participants were shown 
pictures for 25% of the items while others saw items as pictures for only 10% of the study 
time. The results suggested that participants require about 25% of distinctive study 
information for the distinctiveness heuristic to ignite. In order to assess the distinctiveness 
heuristic as a metacognitive mechanism, the expectations of the participants were 
manipulated.  That is, some participants thought that the test would contain items that were 
studied as pictures (uninformed), while others did not (informed). Those in the uninformed 
distinctive group received standard test instructions whereby they were told they would be 
tested on all of the study items. Those in the informed distinctive group were told that they 
would not be asked about picture study items, and that the test included only word study 
items. The results demonstrated that participants did not use a distinctiveness heuristic when 
they believed that they would not be tested on the picture study items. The data further 
indicated that “the distinctiveness heuristic is a strategic mechanism that participants can turn 
on or off depending on their expectations of whether they will or will not be tested on the 
picture study items” (Dodson & Schacter, 2002, pp. 794-795). This study demonstrated how 
the distinctiveness heuristic is a tool for reducing false memories.  
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More important for the present study is the finding that age plays a role in the application of a 
distinctiveness heuristic. Schacter, Israel, and Racine (1999) found age was a factor in 
decision processes and the use of a distinctiveness heuristic. In their experiment, older adults 
showed an increased susceptibility to false memory errors with higher false recognition levels 
compared to younger adults. However, both older and younger adults demonstrated the use of 
a distinctiveness heuristic. 
 
This retrieval strategy has been demonstrated with other distinctive stimuli. Dodson and 
Schacter (2001) explored participants’ use of a distinctiveness heuristic to reduce false 
memory in an experiment where participants studied lists of semantically related words and 
either said or heard words at study. In Dodson and Schacter’s first experiment, they found that 
those participants who were instructed to say words aloud when they saw them at study (the 
‘say’ encoding condition) yielded fewer false recognition responses to related lure items than 
those participants who only heard someone else say the words they saw at study (the ‘hear’ 
encoding condition). This suggests that participants used a distinctiveness heuristic, which 
reduced the rate of false recognition judgments. In addition, the distinctiveness heuristic was 
applied when participants heard some words at study and said others at study (Experiment 2). 
Participants are thought to expect to remember words that they would have said. If this 
expected information is absent, then the participant is likely to infer that the test word is new 
(Dodson & Schacter, 2001). 
 
1.3.1.2 Summary and relevance to the current study 
The distinctiveness heuristic is a retrieval strategy which can aid effective suppression of false 
memories. According to this view, individuals base their retrieval decisions on expected 
metamemorial beliefs about the type of information they feel they should remember. Several 
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studies have demonstrated adults’ use of this heuristic as a retrieval tool. It has been suggested 
that children may not have developed the metacognitive thinking that would aid in their 
decision making (Dodson et al., 2000). Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin, (2002) have demonstrated 
that five- and seven-year-old children do not show the workings of the distinctiveness 
heuristic. The current study will explore whether eleven-year-old children employ such a 
mechanism. 
 
1.3.2 The impoverished relational-encoding account 
According to the impoverished relational-encoding account, studying pictures (distinctive 
information) interferes with the encoding of relational information, which results in fewer 
false memory errors. This account draws together several different theoretical approaches 
which are explored below. It is a compilation of Hunt and colleagues’ distinction between 
item-specific and relational information, the activation-monitoring framework, and fuzzy-
trace theory. These explanations share the premise that studying distinctive information 
decreases the amount of memorial information that is elicited by the related-lure item (Hege 
& Dodson, 2004) in the DRM paradigm. It is not known whether eleven-year-old children 
will demonstrate patterns of behaviour consistent with the impoverished relational-encoding 
account, as has been shown with adults. The following section provides a detailed description 
of the three theoretical accounts that comprise the impoverished relational-encoding account.  
 
1.3.2.1 Hunt and colleagues’ distinction between item-specific and relational information 
Work by Hunt and colleagues has revealed a distinction between item-specific and relational 
information (Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). In item-specific processing, 
the features and distinctive qualities of items are encoded (Storbeck & Clore, 2005). 
Relational information refers to words that are conceptually related to a studied item. This 
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type of processing involves encoding items in relation to other concepts in memory (Storbeck 
& Clore, 2005). Einstein and Hunt’s (1980) research showed the importance of relational 
information and item-specific information to memory. Item-specific and relational processing 
can affect learning and remembering in both favourable and unfavourable ways.  Hege and 
Dodson (2004, p. 787) note how “studying distinctive information may increase memory for 
item-specific information at the expense of memory for relational information”.  
 
Using the DRM paradigm, Smith and Hunt (1998) found a modality effect on false memory. 
Their studies demonstrated a reduction in the level of false memory after visual presentation, 
compared to aural presentation. According to Smith and Hunt, the cues of free recall 
instructions can re-establish the critical items as the presented items (Smith & Hunt, 1998). 
The reduction in false memory is thought to be attributed to item-specific processing, which 
can facilitate the discriminative process of distinctiveness at retrieval (Smith & Hunt, 1998). 
According to Smith and Hunt (1998, p. 714), this modality effect “suggests that even subtle 
differences in processing of critical and presented items at study can service the distinctive 
processing in retrieval that is necessary to reduce false memory”. Smith and Hunt (1998) 
further believe that the level of false memory can be reduced through item-specific processing 
of list words, which can facilitate discrimination of the items from non-presented items. They 
postulate that differential processing during encoding can facilitate discrimination at retrieval, 
which produces a reduced false memory effect (Smith & Hunt, 1998). Hunt and colleagues’ 
work demonstrates how item-specific information decreases the amount of memorial 
information elicited by the related lure item, leading to reduced false memory errors.  
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1.3.2.2 The activation monitoring framework 
Roediger and colleagues presented another theoretical approach known as the activation-
monitoring framework. From this perspective, reduced false memories could occur because 
the study of distinctive information decreases the spread of activation from studied items to 
the related lure (Hege & Dodson, 2004). Spreading activation is likely to occur at encoding 
and during retrieval in the DRM paradigm (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). According to 
the activation-monitoring framework, concepts are activated in episodic or semantic memory 
and are thought to spread among neighbouring concepts. Thus the mental representation of 
activated words can partially activate related words in an associative semantic network. In this 
way, words can arouse an implicit associative response. Roediger and colleagues’ framework 
explores the influence of activation processes and interconnected and related networks in the 
development of false memories (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). Thematically related 
items in word lists can activate and prime critical non-presented items.  Encoding information 
as pictures as opposed to words can decrease activation of the critical lure (e.g., Roediger, 
Balota, & Watson, 2001; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001; Hege & Dodson, 
2004). 
 
1.3.2.3. Fuzzy-trace theory 
A final important theoretical position to consider is the fuzzy-trace theory.  According to 
fuzzy-trace theory, there are two types of memory traces that result from experience: gist 
traces and verbatim traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 1996, 1998a). The former refers to the general 
meaning of experience, while the latter represents specific attributes (Roediger et al., 2001). 
Brainerd and Reyna state that the main difference between the two types of information is that 
verbatim memory is located in the part of memory that records the subject’s actual 
experiences. In contrast, gist traces are added to memory by the individual rememberers. 
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Brainerd and Reyna distinguish between the two traces, viewing verbatim traces as records of 
‘actual’ experiences and gist traces as ‘understanding’ of their experiences (e.g., Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2004). From this perspective, correct recall and recognition results from information 
extracted from verbatim traces, while false recall and recollection is thought to result from the 
extraction of gist information. Brainerd and Reyna’s 1998 experiment demonstrated the effect 
of memory tests that encourage reliance on gist information. The authors found that 
recognition memory tests which encouraged reliance on gist information can lead participants 
to accept things that were not experienced more easily than things that were experienced. 
Fuzzy-trace theory provides a theoretical account which explains how the study of distinctive 
information may decrease the occurrence of, or reliance on, gist representations, which in turn 
should lead to fewer errors (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998a). 
 
1.3.2.4 Support for the impoverished relational-encoding account 
Arndt and Reder (2003) present evidence in support of the impoverished relational-encoding 
account as an explanation for reduced false recognition of critical lures. They presented study 
items in unusual fonts and explored what effect these distinctive fonts would have on true and 
false recognition. Participants falsely recognized fewer critical lures from items that were 
presented using distinctive fonts. The unusual fonts placed emphasis on the encoding of item-
specific information. This, in turn, diminished the encoding of relational information, and lent 
support to the impoverished relational-encoding account. Arndt and Reder’s results are not 
consistent with the distinctiveness heuristic account, which would predict a reduction in false 
recognition rates to all critical lures, and not just those that were presented in unique fonts. 
Arndt and Reder found that false recognition varied across the font conditions in all three of 
their experiments, even when the experiment was manipulated within participants. This would 
suggest the use of memory-based processes. In contrast, the distinctiveness heuristic uses 
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decision-based processes. Besides, the distinctiveness heuristic is not likely to demonstrate 
false recognition errors across conditions in a within participants design (Schacter et al., 1999; 
Dodson & Schacter, 2001).  
 
1.3.2.5 Summary and relevance to the present study 
In summary, Hunt et al.’s distinction between item-specific and relational information, the 
activation-monitoring framework, and fuzzy-trace theory all combine to form the 
impoverished relational-encoding framework. According to this account, distinctive 
information restricts relational and associative information. Distinctive information possesses  
less of the memorial information that is elicited by a related-lure item (Hege & Dodson, 
2004). In support of this, Hege and Dodson found that item-specific encoding can impoverish 
relational processing. In turn, participants made fewer errors after studying item-specific 
information in the form of pictures relative to words. Hege and Dodson’s finding indicates 
that picture encoding interfered with relational information and led to reduced false memory 
errors.  
 
The current study explored whether studying pictures suppresses the encoding of relational 
information in eleven-year-old children. This was measured by the reporting of critical lures 
by participants when they were instructed to report studied items as well as related items. If 
participants in this inclusion condition (inclusion instruction condition) reported critical lures 
less often after picture encoding than after word encoding, then the results would lend support 
to the impoverished relational-encoding account.  
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1.4 Exploring whether distinctive information reduces false memories in children 
To my knowledge only one study has explored whether distinctive information reduces false 
memories in children. Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin (2002) found that distinctive information 
reduced false memories in children aged 5 and 7. Children made fewer errors after studying 
distinctive information. Moreover, when words were encoded with pictures, children were 
more likely to recognise studied words. The study also examined the role of the 
distinctiveness heuristic to account for the reduced errors. Ghetti et al. consider it unlikely that 
the five- and seven-year-old children in their study implemented the distinctiveness heuristic, 
on account of the explicit and systematic nature of the heuristic. Notwithstanding this finding, 
Ghetti et al.’s results demonstrate that distinctiveness can reduce false memories in children.  
 
It is vital that we further our understanding of the potential developmental differences in 
children that can affect false recall and recognition. This research seeks to explore whether the 
use of distinctive information reduces false memories in eleven-year-old children, an area that 
needs further investigation. It also aims to examine whether older children will show reduced 
false memories by using the retrieval strategy of the distinctiveness heuristic. One of the main 
conclusions by Ghetti et al. was that future research is needed to explore whether there is a 
developmental change in the use of item-distinctive information (Ghetti et al., 2002). The 
present study initiates research in an area where literature is lacking. It concerns the 
exploration of the mechanisms or processes that might be involved in the reduction of false 
memories in older children.  
 
1.4.1 Children’s susceptibility to the DRM paradigm 
There is conflicting evidence in the literature about children’s susceptibility to false 
recognition in the DRM paradigm. Roediger and McDermott (1995) believe that young 
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children would be particularly prone to the DRM effect, due to their deficient source-
monitoring skills (Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983). On the other hand, fuzzy-trace theory 
suggests that young children will not show susceptibility to the DRM effect, as they are less 
likely to create gist memories of the semantic relatedness of the DRM lists (Dewhurst & 
Robinson, 2004). 
 
In support of the fuzzy-trace account, Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest (2002) discovered that the 
false memory phenomenon is less pronounced in early childhood. Lists from the DRM task 
were presented aurally and the participants were given a form of recall test. In the 5-7 year 
age group the critical lure false recall level was very low, with rates of 6-7% in their first two 
experiments and 10% in their third experiment. In the 11-year-old children, the critical lure 
false recall rate was higher than for the 5-7 year age group, but still less than half of that of 
the adult percentage (27% and 64% respectively).  
 
Previous studies with this age group have suggested that children are using a range of 
semantic-processing strategies spontaneously. These strategies include elaboration and 
organisation, and are thought to aid in extracting the gist of individual words and in 
connecting gist across multiple words (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Bjorklund, 2000; 
Bjorklund & Muir, 1988). This suggests that there are marked developmental differences 
between the two age groups (5-7 year olds and eleven-year-olds) in the processes which are 
important to the DRM illusion. Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest, (2002) explain this 
developmental difference in terms of fuzzy-trace theory. They believe that “verbatim and gist 
memories operate independently and develop differently from young childhood to adulthood” 
(Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005, p. 14; Brainerd et al., 2002). Verbatim memory is thought to 
improve from young childhood to early adolescence, but gist memory is not thought to be as 
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pronounced in younger children. According to Brainerd and Reyna (2004), young children 
may not be able to extract the meaning or gist of DRM lists, which could explain why they 
demonstrate a low rate of false memory errors. This absence of gist memory is thought to 
explain why the false memory levels were so low in young children and increased through to 
young adolescents (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002; Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005). Further, 
Brainerd et al. explain how the ability to spontaneously connect gist takes a long time to 
develop. The researchers found a difference between the levels of false memories in older 
children and in adults. It is thought that the lower levels of false recall in older children, 
compared to adults, demonstrate that the development of the ability to connect the gist of 
individual words continues to increase until adulthood. In support of this view, Diliberto-
Macaluso (2005) found a false memory effect in young adolescents (ranging in age from 9.5 
to 12 years) that was comparable to Brainerd et al.’s findings with eleven-year-old children. 
Both studies demonstrate that the level of false memory in older children is lower than that of 
adults. 
 
In contrast, Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin (2002) did not find any significant age differences in 
the false memory effect in their study with five- and seven-year-old children. In addition, they 
found no marked differences in false memory formation relative to adults, with children 
producing comparable false memory effects in recall and recognition for critical lures. 
According to Brainerd et al., these inconsistencies in the findings may be due to the different 
experimental procedures, with differences in the length of the DRM lists (Ghetti et al.’s word 
lists were 7 words, not 15) and differences in the presentation of the stimuli. They suggest an 
explanation from fuzzy-trace theory, whereby the presentation of shorter lists and visual 
stimuli could have resulted in a reversal of the developmental trend of the false memory effect 
for two reasons. Firstly, these variables have shifted performance on the memory test to 
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reliance on verbatim memory. Secondly, it is thought that the size of this shift may increase 
with age (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002). 
 
1.4.2 Rationale for the age group selected 
Thus far, the role of distinctive information in reducing false memories has solely been 
explored in adults and in 5- and 7-year-old children. Brainerd et al. (2002) demonstrated 
marked developmental differences in false recall and recognition between younger and older 
children, and between older children and adults, using DRM word lists. Older children had a 
higher occurrence of false memories than younger children, but their levels of false recall 
were still lower than adult levels.  Diliberto-Macaluso (2005) also found lower levels of false 
recall with word lists in older children relative to adults, which indicates that this age group is 
of particular relevance to the study of false memories in the DRM paradigm. It is also useful 
to examine the role of distinctive information in reducing false memories in older children. 
By the age of eleven, children are thought to have completed their developmental shift from 
phonological to semantic processing (see Dewhurst & Robinson, 2004). Therefore, by this 
age, it is thought that children can relate the DRM lists semantically. Whether distinctive 
stimuli can demonstrate reductions in false memories with older children is an open empirical 
question. 
 
1.5 Research Design 
The aim of this research is to explore whether distinctive information will reduce false 
memories in 11-year-old children, and if so, whether this can be explained by two accounts 
which have reliably explained false memories in adults. There are two potentially important 
differences between this study and that of Hege and Dodson (2004). Firstly, the presentation 
time of each picture and word was extended by two seconds for the child participants. Ghetti 
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et al. (2002) suggest that it is important to ensure that children are given sufficient time to 
encode and retrieve material. Secondly, some of the pictures and words were adapted and 
modified in order to be more age-appropriate to children’s understanding. This measure, taken 
to make the current study comparable to Hege and Dodson’s study with adults, was designed 
to reduce the likelihood that any differences between the two studies were due to 
methodological design (Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest, 2002).  For this reason, any minor 
differences between the two studies should be informative. 
 
The experiment is modelled on the work of Hege and Dodson (2004) and compares false 
recall of words and pictures. There were two encoding conditions: half of the participants 
studied pictures while the other half studied words.  
 
The retrieval instructions were manipulated in order to examine the predictions of both the 
distinctiveness heuristic and the impoverished relational-encoding accounts. Some 
participants received standard recall instructions while others received inclusion recall 
instructions in order to discriminate between the two accounts. Standard recall instructions 
involved participants only recalling the studied items. In contrast, inclusion recall instructions 
involved recalling both studied items and related items. Participants given inclusion recall 
instructions were then asked to go back through all the items that they had recalled and place 
a tick next to those items that they thought were actually presented during study. This 
constituted the post-recall recognition test. A further analysis was conducted from the data 
from participants in the inclusion recall instruction, in order to explore whether children used 
a distinctiveness heuristic during their post-recall recognition test. In addition to standard and 
recall instructions, a third group of participants received specific recall instructions designed 
to elicit specific pictorial information, in order to investigate whether the distinctiveness 
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heuristic may be applied at recall. Thus there were three retrieval instruction conditions: 
standard, inclusion, and specific instructions.  
 
In the present experiment, the design differs from that of Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin (2002) in 
its distinctive presentation format, as this study presented pictures without accompanying 
written words. Although Ghetti et al. found that distinctive information reduced false 
memories in children aged 5 and 7, different trends may emerge in the current study due to 
the different presentation modality and the developmental age group. Ghetti et al. believe that 
it is unlikely that the children in their study implemented the distinctiveness heuristic, owing 
to young children’s limited spontaneous metacognitive and strategic skills. The current study 
explores whether older children may have developed these skills, which would make it more 
likely that they would employ the distinctiveness heuristic as a decision rule. Hege and 
Dodson suggest that the distinctiveness heuristic may be applied at recall in a particular 
instruction condition. Therefore, the current research includes the specific instruction 
condition where participants only report items that elicit specific pictorial information in 
memory. 
 
The specific instruction condition involves participants reporting only study items that they 
can remember seeing appear on the screen. If there is a larger difference between the two 
encoding conditions in the recall rates of the critical lures under the specific instructions than 
under the inclusion instructions, this would indicate that participants have used the 
distinctiveness heuristic as a retrieval strategy. Should this effect arise, it would demonstrate 
that participants given specific instructions edit out and withhold the reporting of critical lures 
as a result of studying pictures. In addition, it would provide evidence for the distinctiveness 
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heuristic being applied at recall. Hege and Dodson (2004) did not find that the distinctiveness 
heuristic was applied at recall. 
 
The design is a between-groups design. When participants study both pictures and words, not 
remembering distinctive information about a test item may not necessarily mean that it is 
novel, but that the item was from one of the lists presented as words. In contrast, a between-
groups design allows discrimination of studied words from non-studied words, as only studied 
words will bring to mind the associated pictorial information (Dodson & Schacter, 2002). 
This is elicited through recognition when the item is generated in the participants’ recall 
attempt. The absence of pictorial information signifies that an item is new. However, the 
pictorial information is only available to those who are presented with pictures.  
 
1.6 Hypotheses 
 
1) It was expected that children would demonstrate a false memory effect. That is, that they 
would remember critical non-presented lure words that are associated with the study lists 
presented. 
 
2) It was expected that studying pictures would reduce false memories in older children. That 
is, the effect of the distinctive encoding manipulation should be evident. Any reduction in 
errors and differences from studying pictures might be explained by the impoverished 
relational-encoding and distinctiveness heuristic accounts.  
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Specific predictions for the impoverished relational-encoding account 
Two predictions derive from impoverished relational-encoding. First, participants given 
inclusion recall instructions were expected to report critical lures less often after picture 
encoding than after word encoding, under both standard and inclusion recall instructions. This 
is because the retrieval instructions cannot impact on the rate at which critical lures are 
reported if those lures do not come to mind in the first place. The second prediction concerns 
the probability of recalling studied items.  Participants who studied words were expected to 
recall more studied items under inclusion instructions than under standard instructions. In 
contrast, participants who studied pictures were expected to show comparable rates of studied 
items under both the standard and inclusion instructions. This is because picture encoding 
reduces the inclination for participants to use relational information. Thus there is a predicted 
interaction between the encoding conditions and the retrieval instructions concerning the 
probability of recalling studied items (Hege & Dodson, 2004).  
 
Specific predictions for the distinctiveness heuristic account 
Three predictions derive from the distinctiveness heuristic account. First, it was expected that 
there would be a larger difference between the two encoding conditions in the recall rates of 
the critical lures under the standard instructions than under the inclusion instructions. 
Analyses of recall rates of the critical lures should show an interaction between the encoding 
condition and the retrieval condition. More specifically, results should show a difference in 
false recall rates of critical lures after picture encoding versus word encoding under the 
standard test instructions, but this difference should be reduced or eliminated under the 
inclusion recall instructions. Second, a further examination of the distinctiveness heuristic at 
recall would be achieved by exploring the differences between specific and inclusion 
instruction conditions.  It was expected that there would be a larger difference between the 
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two encoding conditions in the recall rates of the critical lures under the specific instructions 
than under the inclusion instructions, as this pattern indicates that participants have used the 
distinctiveness heuristic as a retrieval strategy. The third prediction relates to the post-recall 
recognition test. This test concerns the proportion of studied items and critical lures, reported 
under inclusion instructions, which were later endorsed as having been presented in the 
encoding phase. Results were expected to demonstrate a significant effect of encoding, a 
significant effect of item type (studied items and critical lures) and an encoding × item type 
interaction. Participants who studied pictures were expected to falsely recognise a 
significantly smaller proportion of critical lures than those participants who studied words. In 
addition, the rates of studied items in the two encoding conditions were expected to be 
comparable. These three predictions relate to the fact that participants who study pictures 
rather than words use a retrieval strategy to withhold reporting items that lack expected 
memorial information (Hege & Dodson, 2004). 
 
3) The retrieval manipulation would have a significant effect on recall rates. Specifically, if 
students were assigned retrieval instructions in the standard recall condition then they would 
be expected to recall fewer critical lure words than those assigned to the inclusion recall 
condition. Further, if participants were given specific recall instructions then it was expected 
that they would recall the lowest number of critical lure words.  
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2.0 METHOD 
 
Children ranging in age from 10-12 years studied DRM lists presented as either pictures or 
words on a projector screen. After a distractor task, participants were randomly assigned to 
recall the studied items following standard, inclusion, or specific instructions.  
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Two hundred and forty-two children aged between 10 and 12 years (Year 7) were recruited 
from six intermediate schools in Christchurch, New Zealand. Principals were approached via 
letter (see Appendix 1), which usually resulted in a follow-up meeting. Participants were 
tested in classrooms in groups ranging from 9 to 35 students. Within each school, students 
were assigned at random to picture and word groups. 
 
2.2 Apparatus and materials 
 
The words and pictures of Hege and Dodson (2004) were used in this experiment. Their 
picture stimuli were based on the pictures created by Israel and Schacter (1997), and the 
corresponding names for the items were based on the Roediger and McDermott (1995) word 
lists and on Russell and Jenkins’ (1954) word-association norms.  
 
The stimuli comprised 6 lists of 12 words, with each list related to a critical non-presented 
lure word. The 6 lists of words were presented in succession as 72 study items at a rate of five 
seconds per item. Half of the participants studied pictures while the other half studied words 
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(see Appendices 2 and 3). As the stimuli were presented, the researcher named each one of 
the 72 study items aloud (see Appendix 4).  
 
A few words and pictures were modified to enhance the children’s understanding. For 
example, pilot testing revealed that ten- and eleven-year-old children did not understand 
stethoscope, and candy was replaced with lollies, which is more common in New Zealand.  
The order of the six lists was randomized and all the participants received the words and 
stimuli in this same random order. The six lists each comprised 12 semantically related items 
which were presented in order of decreasing associative strength to the non-presented critical 
lure. The pilot study revealed that words relating to the critical lure needle did not produce 
strong associations or a false memory effect in the 10-12 age group. For this reason, a list 
relating to the critical lure music was included instead of the needle list. The music list was 
cited by Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) as one of the most effective lists in 
producing a false memory effect.  
 
The pictures and words were projected from a laptop computer via a data projector to appear 
in the centre of a large white screen at the front of the room. Words were displayed in lower 
case 48 point Franklin Gothic Demi font. The pictures used were black-and-white line 
drawings varying in size and provided by Hege and Dodson.  After pilot testing, some 
pictures were replaced with original black-and-white drawings in order to ensure children’s 
recognition.  Words and picture names were spoken by the researcher as each item was 
displayed.  
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The distractor task consisted of a “Haunted House Maze”, which was presented on an A3 
page in greyscale format (see Appendix 5). The recall instructions were printed on A4 pages 
that participants turned over when instructed to do so (see Appendix 6 for instructions).  
 
2.3 Procedure 
Before testing was undertaken, ethical approval to conduct this research was obtained from 
the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (see Appendix 7). Participants could 
only take part in the study if they returned a parental consent form (see Appendix 8).  
 
Within each school, groups of students were first randomly assigned in equal numbers to 
picture and word groups. On arrival, each participant was brought into the classroom and 
introduced to the researcher and her assistant. Participants were then randomly assigned in 
equal numbers to one of the three instruction conditions. Each group was stationed in a 
different area of the classroom. Participants given standard recall instructions were asked to 
remember as many of the words or pictures as they could (see Appendix 6, i and ii). An 
inclusion recall instruction group was instructed to recall not only as many words or pictures 
as they could remember but also any related words that they could think of (see Appendix 6, 
iii and iv). After participants in this condition had recalled their items, they were asked to go 
through their recalled list and place a tick next to items that were presented during the study 
phase. Finally, those given specific recall instructions were asked to report only the items that 
they could remember seeing on the projector screen (see Appendix 6, v and vi).  
 
Students were instructed to pay careful attention to the items they would see and hear, as a 
memory test would follow. The instructions were also presented on the large screen. Students 
assigned to the word-encoding condition were told that they would hear an item named and 
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see the word appear on the computer screen. Those assigned to the picture-encoding condition 
were told that they would hear the item named and see a picture of the item appear on the 
computer screen.  
 
The study items were presented at a rate of one every five seconds. Participants were told that 
the six lists would be shown in succession without a break, and that it would take 
approximately six minutes for all the items to appear. They were also told that they were to be 
silent while the study items appeared on the screen.  
 
After this study phase the participants were asked to turn over the A3 page on their desk and 
work on the “Haunted House Maze” for 5 minutes. Following this distractor task, participants 
were asked to turn over the piece of paper in front of them and respond to their own 
individual instructions printed on the sheet (see Appendix 6). The participants were told that 
they were to write the items they were asked to recall under test conditions where no talking 
was allowed. They were also told that they were not to look at the answers of pupils near 
them. Finally, they were told that the researcher would go around each group to check 
students’ understanding of the instructions. They were informed that each group had a 
different set of instructions and that they should concentrate on the instructions in front of 
them. Those in the inclusion instruction condition received additional instructions to go 
through their reported items and tick the items that they thought were actually presented to 
them during the study phase. This constituted the post-recall recognition task. 
 
At the conclusion of the experiment the children were thanked for their participation. They 
were offered a small chocolate bar as a token of appreciation and were given a debriefing 
form to take home to their parents (see Appendix 9). 
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3.0 RESULTS 
 
 
3.1 Group formation 
The encoding condition (picture vs word) and recall instruction (standard vs inclusion vs 
specific) were manipulated between subjects. The data were analysed using a between groups 
2 (pictures vs words) × 3 (instruction condition) factorial design. Data from twelve of the 242 
participants were excluded for the following reasons: failure to return parental consent forms; 
failure to follow instructions; or obvious displays of cheating. The remaining 230 participants 
fell into the six groups of between 32 and 44 subjects.  
 
3.2 Reporting of critical lure words 
A single sample t-test was conducted for each of the six groups to test the rate that critical 
lures were reported against the hypothesis that no critical lure words would be remembered. 
Analyses determined that all groups were significantly different from zero (see Table 1). This 
result supports the first hypothesis that children were demonstrating a false memory effect, as 
indicated by their recall of critical non-presented lure words.  
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Table 1 
Critical lure error rates in the six instruction conditions 
 
  Mean Std.Dv. N Std.Err. t-value df p 
                
Pictures  
     Standard 0.13 0.14 38 0.02 5.52 37 <.001 
Words  
     Standard 0.12 0.14 38 0.02 5.24 37 <.001 
Pictures  
     Inclusion 0.26 0.20 37 0.03 7.86 36 <.001 
Words  
     Inclusion 0.29 0.20 38 0.03 8.75 37 <.001 
Pictures  
     Specific 0.23 0.49 38 0.08 2.86 37 <.01 
Words  
     Specific 0.15 0.16 38 0.03 6.03 37 <.001 
 
 
3.3 Recall rates of studied items that were presented in word lists 
The recall rates of studied items were analysed to test the predictions of the impoverished 
relational-encoding account. This analysis involved exploration of the recall rates of items 
from the 72 stimuli in the study lists under the three instruction conditions (standard, 
inclusion, and specific). A 2 (encoding condition: picture vs word) × 3 (test instructions: 
standard vs inclusion vs specific) ANOVA was used to examine the recall rates of the studied 
items. This analysis produced a significant effect of test instructions, F(2, 225) = 4.40, p< 
0.05. The main effect of encoding was not significant, F(1, 225) = 0.17, p> 0.70. In addition, 
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there was no significant interaction between encoding and retrieval conditions, F(2, 225) = 
2.13, p > 0.1. The probabilities of recalling studied items are presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Probability of recalling studied items under standard, inclusion, and specific instruction 
conditions collapsed across picture- and word-encoding conditions. Vertical bars indicate the standard 
error of the mean. 
 
Although there was no significant interaction, specific effects were predicted between 
encoding and retrieval conditions. Therefore, a post hoc Tukey HSD test for unequal N 
revealed that only one difference was significant between recall instructions at the .05 level. 
This was between the word-inclusion instruction group (M= 0.25) and the word-specific 
instruction group (M=0.35). There were no statistically significant differences as a function of 
instruction condition under picture-encoding conditions (all p values >.20). This pattern of 
results does not fit the predictions of the impoverished relational-encoding account. As there 
was no significant effect of encoding nor any significant interaction between encoding and 
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retrieval conditions, the results do not demonstrate impaired acquisition of relational 
information during picture encoding.  
 
3.4 Critical lure recall rates 
 
The critical lure recall rates under the three instruction conditions are displayed in Figure 2. A 
2 (encoding condition: picture vs word) × 3 (instructions: standard vs inclusion) ANOVA 
conducted on the rate at which critical lures were recalled yielded significant main effects of 
the test instructions, F(2, 225) = 6.13, p < .01.  More critical lures were reported under the 
inclusion instructions than under standard instructions. In addition, fewer critical lures were 
reported under the specific instruction condition than under the inclusion instruction 
condition. There was no significant main effect of the encoding condition: rates of critical 
lures were comparable for pictures and words, F(1, 225) = 1.17, p > 0.2, with marginally 
higher overall recall rates in the picture condition than in the word condition. There was no 
significant interaction between retrieval and encoding conditions, F(2,225) = 0.81, p >0.4.  
 
Specific predictions were given relating to the impoverished relational-encoding account and 
the distinctiveness heuristic account. Therefore, a post hoc Tukey HSD test for unequal N 
revealed only one difference was significant at the .05 level, which was between the word-
standard instruction group (M=0.11) and the word-inclusion instruction group (M=0.27). No 
other differences were statistically significant. 
 
The impoverished relational-encoding account was not supported, as participants given 
inclusion recall instructions did not report critical lures less often after picture encoding than 
after word encoding under both standard and inclusion recall instructions. In addition, the 
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distinctiveness heuristic account was not supported, as there was not a larger difference 
between the two encoding conditions in the recall rates of the critical lures under standard 
instructions than under the inclusion instructions.  
 
These results do not suggest that critical lures are less likely to come to mind after picture 
encoding than after word encoding. Therefore they fail to lend support to either the 
impoverished relational-encoding or the distinctiveness heuristic account. Instead, the results 
appear to indicate that children do not show reduced false memories by studying pictures as 
opposed to words.  
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Figure 2.  Probability of recalling critical lures under standard, inclusion, and specific instruction 
conditions collapsed across picture- and word-encoding conditions. Vertical bars indicate the standard 
error of the mean. 
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3.4.1 Specific recall  
 
The only evidence for the distinctiveness heuristic in Hege and Dodson’s two experiments 
came from the post-recall recognition task. They suggest that the distinctiveness heuristic may 
be applied at recall if participants are given test instructions that emphasize reporting only 
items that elicit pictorial information. Therefore, the specific instruction condition was added 
to the present experiment to explore whether the distinctiveness heuristic would be applied at 
recall. 
 
According to the distinctiveness heuristic account, there will be a greater difference between 
words and pictures in the recall rates of the critical lures under the specific instructions than 
under the inclusion instructions. Participants were expected to remember many more critical 
lures in the inclusion instruction condition. Average probabilities of the critical lure ratings 
were compared between the specific instruction condition and the inclusion instruction 
condition, in order to explore whether the distinctiveness heuristic was applied at recall. The 
distinctiveness heuristic was not applied at recall, as there was not a greater difference 
between the two encoding conditions in the recall rates of the critical lures under the specific 
pictorial instructions than under the inclusion instructions. Recall rates of the critical lures did 
not show an interaction between the encoding condition and the retrieval condition as the 
distinctiveness heuristic account predicts, F(1, 158) = 0.97, p = 0.32.  
 
The average probability trends of the critical lure ratings in the specific and inclusion 
instruction conditions were not consistent with what was predicted. It was expected that there 
would be a larger difference between the two encoding conditions in the recall rates of the 
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critical lures under the specific instructions than under the inclusion instructions. This finding 
did not emerge, so the results fail to support the distinctiveness heuristic account.  
 
3.5 Post-recall recognition rates 
 
Participants in the inclusion instruction condition were instructed to go through the items they 
had recalled and place a tick next to the items they recognized from the encoding phase. This 
post-recall recognition test was used to explore whether children would use a distinctiveness 
heuristic. This analysis concerns the proportion of studied items and critical lures that 
participants reported under the inclusion instruction condition. A 2 (encoding condition: 
picture vs. word) × 2 (item type: studied items vs critical lures) repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted on the proportion of studied items and critical lures reported under the 
inclusion instructions and then endorsed as having been presented during the encoding phase 
(see Figure 3). The ANOVA produced a significant effect of item type, F(1, 66) = 91.56, p < 
0.01. There were no significant main effects of encoding, F(1, 66) = 0.69, p > 0.4 n.s and no 
significant encoding by item type interaction, F(1, 66) = 0.05, p > 0.4. 
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Figure 3. Post-recall recognition rates of both the true recognition rates of studied items and false 
recognition rates of critical lures and non-critical intrusions collapsed across picture- and word-
encoding conditions.1 Vertical bars indicate the standard error of the mean. 
 
Rates of false recognition for critical lures were comparable in both picture (37%) and word 
(35%) conditions. In addition, studied items that were correctly recognized by participants in 
word- and picture-encoding conditions were almost identical (90% and 89.9% for word- and 
picture-encoding conditions respectively). The number of non-critical intrusions falsely 
recognized in the post-recall recognition test by those studying words (18%) was fewer than 
those who studied pictures (31%), but this difference just failed to reach significance, t (58) = 
1.90, p= 0.06.  
 
                                               
1
 Studied items and critical lures are presented as proportions (i.e., the average frequency out of 72 
and 6, respectively). In contrast, the intrusions represent a proportion of how many non-critical 
intrusions participants made during recall which were subsequently endorsed during recognition. For 
example, if a participant reported 5 non-critical intrusions during the recall phase and then claimed that 
1 of those items was ‘old’ during the recognition phase, his/her non-critical intrusion recognition rate 
was 0.2.  
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This pattern of results is not consistent with the predictions of the distinctiveness heuristic, as 
there was no significant effect of encoding, nor any significant interaction between encoding 
and item type. The account expects participants who study pictures to falsely recognize a 
significantly smaller proportion of critical lures than those participants who studied words. It 
also expects the rates of studied items in the two encoding conditions to be comparable. In 
contrast to the predicted patterns, participants studying pictures did not falsely recognise 
significantly fewer critical lures than did the participants studying words.   
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4.0 DISCUSSION 
 
Four clear results emerged from the present study. Firstly, eleven-year-old children 
demonstrated a false memory effect, but their overall average false critical lure recall ratings 
were just over half the level of typical adult rates from other comparable studies.  Secondly, 
participants who studied pictures did not make significantly fewer false memory errors than 
participants who studied words, which demonstrated that distinctive information did not 
reduce false memories in 11-year-old children. Thirdly, factorial analyses revealed a 
significant effect of test instructions. This was indicated in the differences in the reporting of 
critical lures in the three instruction conditions (standard, inclusion, and specific recall). 
Finally, children do not appear to reduce false memories in a manner consistent with adults, 
nor can the results be explained in terms of two accounts that have been proposed to explain 
reduced false memories in adults (the impoverished relational-encoding account and the 
distinctiveness heuristic account). 
 
4.1 The false memory effect in children 
The first hypothesis predicted that children will demonstrate a false memory effect by 
remembering critical non-presented lure words associated with the study lists presented. The 
results supported the first hypothesis, as children with an average age of 11.5 years recalled 
pictures and words that were not presented to them but which were semantically associated 
with the presented stimuli. Critical lure recall ratings ranged from 12% to 29%, averaging 
19.6%. These recall rates approximate to about half of the adult percentage typically reported. 
For example, Hege and Dodson’s overall average critical lure recall rate was 37.5%. In 2002, 
Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest reported a similar finding in their third experiment, when the 
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eleven-year-olds’ false recall percentage of critical non-presented words was less than half of 
the adults’ percentage.  
 
One possible explanation for this difference concerns the degree to which semantic networks 
are activated by a particular concept in adults, compared to children. Bjorklund (2000) 
suggests that every item in semantic memory is represented by nodes which are connected by 
links. Relations between individual nodes can be strengthened by additional encounters with 
items during development. In turn, frequently encountered items are more readily accessed at 
the time of retrieval.  According to Bjorklund (1987), “age differences in semantic memory 
affect the ease with which information in permanent memory can be activated, which in turn 
influences the amount of mental effort available for other cognitive operations” (Bjorklund, 
1987, p. 93). On average, eleven-year-old children will undoubtedly have a more limited 
semantic network compared with adults (Schnieder & Bjorklund, 2001). Greater activation of 
interrelated nodes in memory may explain the higher rates of false memory errors in adults 
relative to children. This places the findings in line with a spreading activation account, which 
has the premise that false recall should increase as the total amount of activation for the 
critical item increases (Roediger, Balota, & Watson, 2001). 
 
As children develop, the number and strength of their associations and their knowledge of 
features of items increase (Schneider & Bjorklund, 2001). An increasing knowledge base with 
subsequent strengthened connections among items makes it easier to activate related items 
after one item in a domain is activated (Schneider & Bjorklund, 2001). Adults may be 
producing higher recall rates of false memories due to the activation of their increased 
semantic network. Generally, false levels of recall increase with age (Bjorklund & Muir, 
1988). This indicates that cognitive development from older adolescents to adults is 
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influential regarding false memory outcomes in the DRM paradigm, and the present results 
appear to be consistent with this perspective. 
 
Nevertheless, past research has demonstrated that eleven-year-old children do adopt at least 
some semantic-processing strategies, such as elaboration and organization. It is thought that 
these strategies aid in the ability to extract the gist of individual words and to connect this 
meaning across multiple words (Bjorklund, 1999; Bjorklund & Muir, 1988; Brainerd, Reyna, 
& Forrest, 2002). Young children appear to be limited in their ability to spontaneously 
connect gist in the way that older children have demonstrated (Bjorklund, 1978). These 
semantic-processing strategies appear to play a vital role in the DRM illusion, as 
demonstrated by Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest’s (2002) finding that the level of false recall in 
children increased from age 7 to age 11.  
 
Generally, older children have more knowledge and prior experience than younger children, 
and therefore have a greater knowledge base, which can improve their ability to learn and 
remember (Shaffer, 2002). This knowledge base is a factor that can enhance memory 
performance between younger and older children, and between older children and adults. 
More detailed knowledge can result in improved memory performance, because it is easier to 
retrieve information that is well established (Bjorklund, 1987; Kee, 1994; Shaffer, 2002).  
Older children’s expanding knowledge base can contribute to their developing ability to 
categorize and elaborate on information compared to younger children. The premise that 
eleven-year-old children are able to spontaneously extract gist places the findings in line with 
fuzzy-trace theory, which postulates that there are important developmental differences in the 
way children encode information (Shaffer, 2002). The ability to spontaneously connect gist 
undergoes an extended period of development. For this reason, the DRM paradigm can 
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produce large developmental increases and age variability in verbatim and gist memory 
(Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002).                                        
 
4.2 The effect of studying distinctive information 
The second hypothesis predicted that children who were designated to study pictures would 
make fewer critical lure errors than children studying words, thus demonstrating the effect of 
studying distinctive information. Surprisingly, the second hypothesis was not supported. That 
is, participants in the picture-encoding condition did not make significantly fewer errors than 
participants in the word-encoding condition. Distinctive information can potentially decrease 
the memorial information which is elicited by the critical lure (Hege & Dodson, 2004). This 
result fails to lend support to the theory that using distinctive information reduces false 
memories in children. 
 
An additional finding relating to differences in the encoding conditions was that studying 
pictures did not demonstrate superior recall of the true studied items. More specifically, 
analyses conducted on the  proportion of true recalled items from the 72 studied items 
revealed no statistically significant main effects of encoding, nor any significant interaction 
between encoding and retrieval conditions. This finding followed the same pattern found in 
the false critical lure recall rate. It appears that children at this particular developmental period 
are encoding and/or retrieving information in a different manner to adults. In this study, the 
use of pictures has not demonstrated a superior effect in the subjects’ ability to remember 
studied items and make fewer false memory errors. Therefore the results cannot be explained 
in terms of the impoverished relational-encoding and distinctiveness heuristic accounts. 
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This null finding is explored by addressing three different interpretations: the floor effect, 11-
year-olds’ semantic networks, and fuzzy-trace theory. The floor effect makes reduced 
memories in this group of children less likely, as the percentage of false recall in this group is 
already low. The children’s false memory recall rates in the current study were much lower 
than the adult rates found by Hege and Dodson. The influence of the encoding condition 
(studying pictures versus studying words) may not have been accurately reflected in the 
dependent variables, because children’s variability (range of responses) is likely to be higher 
compared to adults. Distinctive information may not have been able to reduce false memories 
in children, because their recall rates were already at a low level. 
 
More speculatively, it is also possible that older children are not demonstrating differences 
between picture and word processing as has been seen in adults, because adults have larger 
semantic networks than children. Research has demonstrated that children show differences in 
picture-word effects relative to adults, affected by children’s lower levels of vocabulary and 
semantic networks relative to adults (e.g., Theios & Amrhein, 1989).  For example, Greenham 
and Stelmack (2001) demonstrated that older children (aged from nine to thirteen) showed a 
greater attentional demand when naming pictures than adults did. Their study highlights the 
additional processing involved in naming pictures. 
 
The finding that participants studying pictures did not show reduced false memories 
compared to participants studying words is consistent with fuzzy-trace theory. Application of 
this theory has shown that pictorial stimuli do not automatically suppress false memories in 
subjects (C.J. Brainerd, personal communication, March 1, 2006). The child participants in 
this study may not have processed the pictorial information in the same way as adults would 
(C.J. Brainerd, personal communication, March 1, 2006). Fuzzy-trace theory predicts 
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different developmental patterns in false memories between children and adults in terms of 
participants’ ability to store and process gist memories during recall or recognition. The 
differences in false recall rates after studying DRM lists between older children and adults has 
been demonstrated by Brainerd et al. (2002) and the current study. In addition, these lowered 
levels of false memories make it difficult to see a difference in the encoding of pictures and 
words. 
 
In contrast to most findings with adults, Koutstaal and Schacter (1997) found that both 
younger adults and older adults often made false recognition errors when studying pictures. 
This demonstrates that using distinctive stimuli can still result in false memory errors, which 
is consistent with the current findings. 
 
Contrary to the current findings, Ghetti, Goodman, and Qin (2002) found that distinctive 
information reduced the rate of false memories in five- and seven-year-old children. Ghetti et 
al.’s findings also differed from those of Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest (2002), in that they 
found a decrease in false recall of critical lure words from 35% in 5-year-olds to 19% in 7-
year-olds. Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest, (2002) had shown false recall of critical lures 
increased between childhood and adolescence. Ghetti et al. presented short DRM lists with 7 
words as opposed to the more usual 15 words. Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest (2002) have 
noted that Ghetti et al.’s different procedures may have reversed the developmental trends in 
the false-memory effect, and could explain why Ghetti et al. showed a decrease in false recall 
from 5 year olds to 7 year olds. For this reason, it is possible that the differences between the 
current study and that of Ghetti et al. could also be the result of procedural methods. The lists 
in this study consisted of either 12 words or pictures. Future research should address this 
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discrepancy and the effect of procedural modifications by systematically varying the list 
length for children in different age ranges.  
 
4.3 Manipulation of retrieval instructions 
The final hypothesis tested concerned the effect of the manipulation of the retrieval 
instructions. It was expected that students assigned to the standard recall instructions would 
report fewer critical lure words than students assigned to the inclusion recall instructions. 
Further, the smallest number of critical lure words should be reported in the specific recall 
condition, where students are asked to solely recall either the pictures or words that they 
remember seeing on the projector screen.   
 
Partial support was found for the third hypothesis relating to the effect of manipulation of the 
retrieval instructions. As expected, the probability of recalling critical lures was highest in the 
inclusion recall instruction condition. Contrary to predictions, the smallest recall rates of 
critical lures occurred in the standard recall instruction condition, not in the specific recall 
instruction condition (see Figure 2). These significant findings indicate that the test 
instructions had the potential to alter children’s recall at the time of retrieval.  
 
A surprising result was found relating to the specific instruction condition. It was expected 
that participants in this condition would report the smallest number of critical lure words in 
both encoding conditions, owing to the instructions’ purpose of eliciting specific remembered 
information. In contrast to the hypothesis, the smallest number of critical lure words was 
reported in the standard recall instruction condition.  
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As demonstrated by the mean standard error bars in Figure 2, there was considerable 
variability from participants in this retrieval condition. This suggests that the specific 
instruction condition did not have the desired effect, and may not have been measuring what it 
was intended to measure. Given the error, it’s possible that this result was some product of the 
data.  
 
Results may have been affected by the testing conditions. Participants were tested in class 
groups. Subjects in the specific pictorial instruction condition had fewer words to write on 
their answer sheets. They may have been influenced by members of other instruction groups 
in the same room who had a considerable number of recalled answers to record. In this way, 
the children may have been behaving in what they perceived to be a socially-desirable way, 
by recording as much as they could remember. Future research could involve testing 
participants individually in order to examine this retrieval condition more effectively. 
 
4.4 Differences in reducing false memories between children and adults 
Finally, one of the major aims of the study was to examine the differences in the study of 
distinctive information between children and other studies involving adults. Hege and Dodson 
(2004) found that studying distinctive information (in the form of pictures) leads to reduced 
false memory errors. Their results are consistent with the accounts that explain why studying 
pictures leads to reduced false memories. An open empirical question was whether children 
would show reduced false memories in a way that was consistent with the impoverished 
relational-encoding account and/or the distinctiveness heuristic account. Inclusion recall was 
selected for the study, as it has been a more effective measure of the impoverished relational-
encoding account than inclusion recognition. Inclusion recall is a way of measuring whether 
encoding distinctive information reduces the likelihood of critical lures coming to mind. The 
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impoverished relational-encoding account predicts that picture encoding will produce lower 
rates of critical lure recall than will word encoding in both standard recall and inclusion recall 
instruction conditions (Hege & Dodson, 2004). Although marked differences were found 
between the two instruction conditions, critical lure recall rates were comparable in both 
encoding conditions. Therefore the study did not provide evidence for the impoverished 
relational-encoding account. Children who studied pictures did not make fewer false memory 
errors than children who studied words. In this way, the current study did not find support for 
the notion that distinctive information reduces false memories in eleven-year-old children. 
 
According to the distinctiveness heuristic account, participants who receive standard recall 
instructions are thought to make fewer critical lure errors in the picture-encoding condition 
than in the word-encoding condition. In contrast to the expectations of the impoverished 
relational-encoding account, the distinctiveness heuristic account predicts no significant 
differences in studying pictures relative to studying words in the inclusion recall instruction 
condition. This pattern of findings demonstrates how manipulating the retrieval instructions 
can show how the distinctiveness heuristic can be turned on and off. In other words, 
responding to specific instructions can potentially suppress false memory errors.  Therefore, 
the current findings did not support the distinctiveness heuristic account, as there were no 
significant encoding differences in either the standard or inclusion instruction conditions.  
 
The distinctiveness heuristic was examined in two other ways: through the post-recall 
recognition test and through the specific pictorial instruction condition. Hege and Dodson 
(2004) found evidence for the distinctiveness heuristic account in the post-recall recognition 
test, as their participants who studied pictures reported significantly fewer critical lures than 
participants who studied words. In contrast, children in the post-recall recognition test in the 
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current study did not demonstrate any significant differences in the rates of false recall of 
critical lures across picture and word conditions, indicating that the distinctiveness heuristic 
was not applied by children. 
 
Finally, the additional instruction condition (specific) was designed to test whether the 
distinctiveness heuristic may be applied at recall. Hege and Dodson (2004) only found 
support for the distinctiveness heuristic in the recognition test.  If recall rates between the two 
encoding conditions were greater under the inclusion instructions than under the specific 
pictorial instructions, this would demonstrate the use of this heuristic. The distinctiveness 
heuristic account predicts an interaction between the encoding condition and the retrieval 
condition of the critical lures.  The findings demonstrate that the distinctive heuristic was not 
applied at recall, not even in the new instruction condition. Therefore, eleven-year-old 
children did not appear to apply a distinctiveness heuristic at either recall or post-recall 
recognition. This result was also found by Ghetti et al. (2002), although they used much 
younger subjects (five- and seven-year-olds). It appears that older children have not yet 
developed the metacognitive strategies to aid their use of this retrieval strategy.  
 
Metacognition is thought to develop around the age of eleven years. Children’s metamemorial 
knowledge has been shown to increase with age (Schneider & Pressley 1997; Schneider & 
Bjorklund, 2001). 
 
The impoverished relational-encoding account and the distinctiveness heuristic account were 
tested through the manipulation of the instruction conditions. Although the results did not 
lend support to either of these accounts, there was a significant difference in the three retrieval 
instruction conditions. The manipulation of the instruction condition and the influence on the 
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recall task indicate how children can effectively be influenced into producing a higher or 
lower false memory effect.  
 
4.4.1 Comparisons with adults (Hege & Dodson, 2004) 
To assist in evaluating the present results with children, it is useful to contrast them with the 
previous results with adults reported by Hege and Dodson. Some similarities between the two 
studies were found in the critical lure recall rates. Both studies yielded significant main 
effects of test instructions, as more critical lures were reported under the inclusion instructions 
than were reported under the standard instructions. The major difference between the two 
studies was that Hege and Dodson found a significant main effect of encoding which was not 
found in the current study.  Hege and Dodson reported many more critical lures being recalled 
by participants who studied words than were recalled by those who studied pictures. The 
current study differed, as it resulted in a similar number of critical lures being produced by 
participants studying words and pictures, disconfirming the hypothesis that children will make 
fewer critical lure errors when studying pictures than when studying words.  As there was no 
significant interaction between encoding condition and retrieval condition, the current 
findings fail to support the distinctiveness heuristic account. Contrary to the predictions of the 
distinctiveness heuristic account, there were no significant differences between the two 
encoding conditions in the recall rates of critical lures under the standard instructions and 
under the inclusion instructions.  
 
It is also helpful to examine the studied item recall rates of the two studies. Hege and Dodson 
reported a marginally significant effect of the test instructions, and a significant interaction. 
The current results replicate the significant effect of the test instructions, but in contrast with 
Hege and Dodson, do not conform to a significant interaction. This failure to find an 
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interaction means that the results are not consistent with the impoverished relational-encoding 
account, which predicts an interaction between encoding condition and retrieval instructions 
in terms of the rates at which studied items are recalled. Contrary to the findings of Hege and 
Dodson, in this experiment participants who studied words did not report greater numbers of 
studied items under inclusion instructions than under standard instructions. 
 
Finally, there were differences found in the two studies concerning the true recognition rates 
of studied items and false-recognition rates of critical lures on the post-recall recognition test. 
Hege and Dodson’s  research yielded a significant effect of item type relating to the 
proportion of studied items and critical lures which was reported under the inclusion 
instructions and was later confirmed as having been presented during the encoding phase. 
This finding was comparable to the results of the current study with children.  
 
Hege and Dodson also found a significant effect of encoding and a significant encoding by 
item type interaction. In the inclusion instruction condition, participants who studied pictures 
recognized significantly fewer false critical lures than subjects who studied words. These 
significant differences as a function of instruction condition under picture-encoding 
conditions provided evidence for the distinctiveness heuristic account contributing to the 
reduction in false memories after picture encoding. 
 
In direct contrast, in the inclusion instruction condition of the present study there were no 
significant differences between participants who studied pictures and words in the recognition 
of critical lures. The results from the post-recall recognition test do not display a reduction in 
false memories after picture encoding. For this reason, the results of the post-recall 
recognition recall task do not support the distinctiveness heuristic account. 
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4.5 Limitations of this study  
There are several limitations which could have affected the results. Difficulties arose from 
testing children. Within each testing group there were some children who had trouble 
concentrating and paying attention while all the study items were presented. Students vary in 
their ability to concentrate. It is extremely difficult to verify that all participants paid attention 
to all the study items. On occasion, the researchers noticed a few students who looked at the 
screen for a partial period of the study time only. 
 
It is possible that the length of presentation rate affected the children’s ability to concentrate. 
The rate of presentation of the study items is a variable which could have impacted on the 
results. The stimuli were presented to the children for two seconds longer than to the adult 
subjects in earlier studies. According to Roediger, McDermott, and Robinson (1998), 
predicting the effect of presentation rate on false recall is difficult. False recall can be 
attributed to both slower presentation and faster presentation. Slower presentation may 
enhance false recall due to deeper processing, involving elaborative and relational processing. 
In contrast, faster presentation may make it difficult to encode individual items, leading to 
participants extracting overall themes of lists rather than specific items. The general 
consensus in the literature from recent data suggests that false recall rates are higher when the 
rate of presentation is faster (Roediger, McDermott, & Robinson, 1998).  
 
Children were tested in classrooms in order to cause the least amount of disturbance for 
schools and for efficiency, due to testing such large numbers. Although strict instructions and 
warnings about cheating were given, there were still some obvious instances of cheating. Data 
from those students were excluded from analysis. However, it is possible that other instances 
were not observed. 
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Finally, children were given explicit instructions both verbally and visually. Students were 
given a specific recall task on a piece of paper in front of them on their desk (See Appendix 
6). After reading the instructions, the researcher and her assistant went around all groups of 
students and checked for understanding of instructions, elaborating where necessary. 
Although students would confirm that they understood the instructions, there were occasions 
when their answer sheets would suggest otherwise. Instructions were adjusted after pilot 
testing to ensure they would be appropriate for this particular age group. However, it was not 
possible to ensure that all children understood their instructions or followed them exactly. 
 
4.6 Conclusions and implications 
 
The current study demonstrated the complex role of encoding and retrieval mechanisms in 
older children’s memory processes. Children were found to be susceptible to retrieval 
manipulation. This was demonstrated by the rates of recall of critical lure words differing 
depending on instruction conditions. The study’s main aim was to explore whether using 
distinctive information would reduce false memories in children. In contrast with the 
literature, participants who studied pictures did not make fewer false errors than participants 
who studied words. Therefore, the current findings can not be explained in terms of two 
accounts which have been shown to reduce false memories in adults: the impoverished 
relational-encoding account and the distinctiveness heuristic.  
 
It is evident that children are not using the same encoding and retrieval processes to reduce 
false memories as adults. Future research needs to explore these developmental differences 
further. At what stage do older children’s memory mechanisms resemble those of adults? 
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Comparisons with adult findings suggest that eleven-year-old children’s extensive processing 
is not as developed as adults’, and their knowledge base, including semantic networks, has not 
fully developed. 
  
Research has demonstrated differences in the processing of pictures in comparison to words 
(e.g., Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Smith & Magee, 1980). The current study found no 
significant differences between the encoding conditions, indicating that children are 
processing pictorial information in a different manner to adults. Eleven-year-olds’ false recall 
of critical lure reporting was just over half that of adults, placing the findings in line with 
those of Brainerd, Reyna, and Forrest (2002) with this age group. This lowered level of false 
memory errors may have occurred due to a smaller knowledge base and semantic network 
compared to adults, which may be consequently contributing to comparable rates of critical 
lures in picture- and word-encoding conditions. This account is in line with fuzzy-trace 
theory, which is helpful in its description of developmental changes in encoding (Shaffer, 
2002). As gist traces represent meaning, this highlights the role of semantic information in 
memory. Older children have shown increased development in their semantic abilities by the 
age of eleven, but their semantic processes are not thought to have fully developed. This may 
explain why the results demonstrated different findings to those which have been found with 
adults.  
 
The current study gives insight into the complex role of older children’s memory. The 
implications of the research suggest key developmental differences in the way older children 
study distinctive information in the form of pictures, compared to younger children and 
adults. Howe (1998) suggests that distinctiveness is measured against our own knowledge and 
experience. This being so, it may be that children, who have a more limited number of stored 
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experiences, may not make sharp distinctions between types of stimuli stored in memory. 
Future research could further explore developmental differences in children’s memory from 
the age of 11 to young adulthood. In addition, research could explore the conditions whereby 
eleven-year-old children are able to reduce false memories from the study of distinctive 
information. 
 
 71 
REFERENCES 
Anderson, R.E. (1984). Did I do it or did I only imagine doing it? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 113, (4), 594-613. 
 
Arndt, J., & Reder, L.M. (2003). The effect of distinctive visual information on false 
recognition. Journal of Memory and Language, 48, 1-15. 
 
Baddeley, A. (2001). "Memory". In R. A.Wilson, &  F.C. Keil (Eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia 
of the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bartlett, F.C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Bjorklund, D.F. (2000). Children’s thinking: Developmental function and individual 
differences (3rd ed.). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
 
Bjorklund, D.F. (1987). How age changes in knowledge base contribute to the development 
of children’s memory: An interpretive review. Developmental Review, 7, 93-130 
 
Bjorklund, D.F. (1978). Negative transfer in children’s recall of categorized materials. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 26, 299-307 
 
Bjorklund, D. F., & Muir, J.E. (1988). Children's development of free recall memory: 
Remembering on their own. Annals of Child Development, 5, 79-123. 
 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V.F. (2004). Fuzzy-trace theory and memory development. 
Developmental Review, 24, 396-439. 
 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V.F. (1998a). Fuzzy-trace theory and children's false memories. 
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 71, 81-129. 
 
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V.F. (1998b). When things that were never experienced are easier to 
"remember" than things that were. Psychological Science, 9,(6), 484-489. 
 
Brainerd, C.J., & Reyna, V.F. (1996). Mere memory testing creates false memories in 
children. Developmental Psychology, 32, 467-478. 
 
Brainerd, C.J., Reyna, V.F., & Forrest, T.J. (2002). Are young children susceptible to the 
false-memory illusion? Child Development, 73 (5), 1363-1377. 
 
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V.F. & Kneer, R. (1995). False-recognition reversal: when similarity 
is distinctive. Journal of Memory and Language, 34, 157-185. 
 
Brainerd, C.J., Wright, R., Reyna, V.F. & Payne, D.G. (2002). Dual retrieval processes in free 
and associative recall. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 120-152. 
 
Braun, K.A. (1999). Post-experience advertising effects on consumer memory. Journal of 
Consumer Research, 2, 319-334 
 
 72 
Braun-LaTour, K. A., LaTour, M.S., Pickrell, J.E., & Loftus, E.F. (2004). How and when 
advertising can influence memory for consumer experience. Journal of Advertising, 
33(4), 7-25. 
 
Braun, K.A., Ellis, R. & Loftus, E.F. (2002). Make my memory: how advertising can change 
our memories of the past. Psychology and marketing, 19 (1) , 1-23 
 
Brewer, W. F., & Treyens, J.C. (1981). Role of schemata in memory for places. Cognitive 
Psychology, 14, 207-230. 
 
Brown, N. R., Buchanan, L., & Cabeza, R. (2000). Estimating the frequency of nonevents: 
The role of recollection failure in false recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
7, 684-691. 
 
Brown, J. L., Lewis,V.J., & Monk, A.F. (1977). Memorability, word frequency, and negative 
recognition. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 29, 461-473. 
 
Budson, A.E., Droller, D.B.J., Dodson,C.S., Schacter, D.L., Rugg, M.D., Holcomb, P.J. & 
Daffner, K.R. Electrophysiological dissociation of picture versus word encoding: The 
distinctiveness heuristic as a retrieval orientation. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 
17 (8), 1181-1193 
 
Clark, S. E., & Gronlund, S.D. (1996). Global matching models of recognition memory: How 
the models match the data. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(1), 37-60. 
 
Collins, A., Warnock, E.H., Aiello, N. & Miller, M.L. (1975). Reasoning from incomplete 
knowledge. In D. Bobrow & A. Collins (Eds.), Representation and understanding: 
Studies in cognitive science (383-415). New York: Academic Press. 
 
Craik, F. I. M. & Lockhart, R.S. (1972). Levels of Processing: A framework for memory 
research. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 11, 671-684. 
 
Deese, J. (1959). On the prediction of occurrence of particular verbal intrusions in immediate 
recall. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, (1), 17-22 
 
Dewhurst, S.A., & Robinson, C.A. (2004). False memories in children: evidence for a shift 
from phonological to semantic associations. Psychological Science, 15 (1), 782- 786 
 
Diliberto-Macaluso, K. A. (2005). Priming and false memories from Deese-Roediger-
McDermott lists on a fragment completion test with children. The American Journal 
of Psychology, 118(1), 13-28. 
 
Dodson, C. S., Koutstaal, W. & Schacter, D.L. (2000). Escape from illusion: reducing false 
memories. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(10), 391-397. 
 
Dodson, C. S., &  Schacter, D.L. (2002). When false recognition meets metacognition: The 
distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 46, 782-803. 
 
 73 
Dodson, C. S., & Schacter, D.L. (2001). "If I had said it I would have remembered it": 
Reducing false memories with the distinctiveness heuristic. Psychonomic bulletin & 
review, 8, 155-161. 
 
Einstein, G. O. & Hunt, R.R. (1980). Levels of processing and organization: Additive Effects 
of individual-item and relational processing. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Learning and Memory, 6(5), 588-598. 
 
Foley, M. A., Johnson, M.K., & Raye, C.L. (1983). Age-related changes in confusion 
between memories for thoughts and memories for speech. Child Development, 54(51-
60). 
 
Gentner, D, & Collins, A. (1981). Studies of inference from lack of knowledge. Memory & 
Cognition, 9, 434-443. 
 
Ghetti, S., Goodman, G.S. & Qin, J. (2002). False memories in children and adults: Age, 
distinctiveness, and subjective experience. Developmental Psychology, 38(5), 705-
718. 
 
Greenberg, D. L. (2004). President Bush's false 'Flashbulb' memory of 9/11/01. Applied 
Cognitive Psychology, 18, 363-370. 
 
Greenham, S.L., & Stelmack, R.M. (2001). Event-related potentials and picture-word naming: 
Effects of attention and semantic relation for children and adults. Developmental 
Neuropsychology, 20 (3), 619-638 
 
Hege, A. C. G., & Dodson, C. S. (2004). Why distinctive information reduces false memories: 
evidence for both impoverished relational-encoding and distinctiveness heuristic 
accounts. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 
30(4), 787-795. 
 
Howe, M.L. (1998). When distinctiveness fails, false memories prevail. Journal of 
Experimental Child Psychology, 71, 170-177. 
 
Hunt, R. R., & Einstein., G.O. (1981). Relational and item-specific information in memory. 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 20, 497-514. 
 
Hunt, R. R., & McDaniel, M.A. (1993). The enigma of organization and distinctiveness. 
Journal of Memory and Language, 32, 421-445. 
 
Hyman, I. E., & Pentland, J. (1996). The role of mental imagery in the creation of false 
childhood memories. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 101-117. 
 
Israel, L., & Schacter, D.L. (1997). Pictorial encoding reduces false recognition of semantic 
associates. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 4, 577-581. 
 
Jacoby, L.L. (1991). A process dissociation framework: Separating automatic from intentional 
uses of memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 30, 513-581 
 
 74 
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S. & Lindsay, D.S. (1993). Source monitoring. Psychological 
Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28. 
 
Johnson, M. K., & Raye, C.L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological Review, 88, 67-85. 
 
Kee, D.W. (1994). Developmental differences in associative memory: Strategy use, mental 
effort, and knowledge access interactions. In H.W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child 
development and behaviour (7-32) (Vol.25). New York: Academic Press.  
 
Koutstaal, W. Schacter., D.L. (1997). Gist-based false recognition of pictures in older and 
younger adults. Journal of Memory and Language, 37, 555-583. 
 
Loftus, E. F. (1997). Creating false memories. Scientific American, September, 50-55. 
 
Loftus, E. F. (2003). Make-believe memories. American Psychologist, November, 867-873. 
 
Loftus, E. F. & Palmer, J.C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction: An example of 
the interaction between language and memory. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal 
Behavior, 13, 585-589. 
 
Loftus, E. F. & Pickrell, J.E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 
25(12), 720-725. 
 
Mather, M., Henkel, L.A. & Johnson, M.K. (1997). Evaluating characteristics of false 
memories: Remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire 
compared. Memory & Cognition, 25(6), 826-837. 
 
Payne, D.G., Neuschatz, J.S., Lampinen, J.M. & Lynn, S.J. (1997). Memory for a past that 
never was. Current directions in psychological science, 6 (3), 56-60. 
 
Potter, M.C., & Faulconer, B.A. (1975). Time to understand pictures and words. Nature, 253, 
437-438. 
 
Read, J.D. (1996). From a passing thought to a false memory in 2 minutes: Confusing real and 
illusory events. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3 (1), 105-111 
 
Riegler, A. (2005). Constructive memory. Kybernetes, 34(1/2), 89-104. 
 
Roediger, H. L., III (1996). Memory Illusions. Journal of Memory and Language, 35, 76-100. 
 
Roediger, H. L., III, Balota, D.A. & Watson, J.M. (2001). Spreading activation and arousal of 
false memories. In H. L. Roediger, Nairne, J.S., Neath, I & Suprprenant, A.M. (Ed.), 
The Nature of Remembering: Essays in Honor of Robert G. Crowder (1st ed. ed.). 
Washington DC: American Psychological Association. 
 
Roediger, H.L., III, Watson, J.M., McDermott, K.B., & Gallo, D.A. (2001). Factors that 
determine false recall: A multiple regression analysis. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 8, 385-407 
 
 75 
Roediger, H. L., III, McDermott, K.B. & Robinson, K.J. (1998). The Role of associative 
processes in creating false memories. In M.A. Conway, S.E. Gathercole, & C. 
Cornoldi, C. (Ed.), Theories of Memory (189-245) (Vol. II). Hove, UK: Psychology 
Press. 
 
Roediger, H.L., III, & McDermott, K.B. (1995). Creating false memories: Remembering 
words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 21, 803-814. 
 
Russell, W.A., & Jenkins, J.J. (1954). The complete Minnesota norms for responses to 100 
words from the Kent-Rosonoff Word Association Test. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota. 
 
Schacter, D. L., Cendan, D.L., Dodson, C.S. & Clifford, E.R. (2001). Retrieval conditions and 
false recognition: Testing the distinctiveness heuristic. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 8, 827-833. 
 
Schacter, D.L., Israel, L., & Racine, C. (1999). Suppressing false recognition in younger and 
older adults: The distinctiveness heuristic. Journal of Memory and Language, 40, 1-
24. 
 
Schacter, D. L. Norman., K.A. & Koutstaal, W. (1998). The Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Constructive Memory. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 289-318. 
 
Schneider, W., & Bjorklund, D. (2001). Memory and knowledge development. In J. Valsiner 
& K. Connolly (eds.). Handbook of developmental psychology (375-403). 
London:Sage. 
 
Schneider, W., & Pressley, M. (1989). Memory development between 2 and 20. New York: 
Springer-Verlag. 
 
Shaffer, D.R. (2002). Developmental psychology: childhood and adolescence (6th ed.). 
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomas Learning. 
 
Smith, R. E. & Hunt., R. (1998). Presentation modality affects false memory. Psychonomic 
Bulletin & Review, 5(4), 710-715. 
 
Smith, M.C., & Magee, L.E. (1980). Tracing the time course of picture-word processing. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 109 (4), 373-392 
 
Storbeck, J. & Clore, G.L. (2005). With sadness comes accuracy; with happiness, false 
memory. Psychological Science, 16 (10), 785-791. 
 
Theios, J. & Amrhein, P.C. (1989). Theoretical analysis of the cognitive processing of lexical 
and pictorial stimuli: reading, naming, and visual and conceptual comparisons. 
Psychological Review, 96 (1), 5-24 
 
 76 
APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1:  Example of a letter to a Principal  
Appendix 2:  Slides from the experiment presented to participants in the 
picture-encoding condition  
Appendix 3:  Slides from the experiment presented to participants in the 
word-encoding condition  
Appendix 4:  The 6 lists which comprise 12 semantically related items in 
the order as read aloud by the researcher  
Appendix 5:  Haunted House Maze   
Appendix 6:  Instructions 
Appendix 7:  Letter confirming ethical approval for research  
Appendix 8:  Parental consent form 
Appendix 9:  Debriefing form  
 77 
APPENDIX 1 
 
College of Science 
Department of Psychology 
 
Marissa Blakeley 
Department of Psychology 
University of Canterbury 
Private Bag 4800 
Christchurch 
(03) 364 2987 ext 7988 
 
The Principal 
Shirley Intermediate 
Cnr North Parade and Shirley Road 
Shirley 
Christchurch 
 
Dear Mr Fraser, 
 
My name is Marissa Blakeley and I am a psychology research student at the University of 
Canterbury. I am interested in conducting research with eleven year old children in the 
Canterbury area, and would very much appreciate the opportunity to work with Year 7 students 
at your school. 
 
My research entitled Do children use the same encoding and retrieval mechanisms to reduce false 
memories as adults? An exploration of the use of the impoverished-relational encoding and distinctiveness 
heuristic accounts in children is exploring the ways to reduce inaccurate memories in children. To my 
knowledge, this has only been explored in adults. If successful, the research could carry valuable 
theoretical and practical implications in an important area of psychology. It could improve our 
understanding of the ways that children study and learn distinctive information. 
 
The project involves students studying a series of either pictures or words and then recalling the 
ones they can remember. Following a short distractor task (a maze) they will be asked to 
complete a recognition task. Students are to be tested in a classroom with a projector. 
 
With your approval, the students will be given a small reward as a token of appreciation for their 
participation in the project. This research project has been reviewed and approved by the 
University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. I have developed parental information and 
consent forms. 
 
I would very much appreciate and enjoy the opportunity to work with you and the students of your 
school.  
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Marissa Blakeley     Dr Ewald Neumann (Supervisor) 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
You will be shown a number of pictures
I would like you to study the pictures as carefully as 
you can because I am going to question you on them 
later
You will see 72 pictures
Each picture will appear on the screen for 5 seconds
I will speak the name of each picture while you are 
looking at it
   
The next slide is a practice 
trial
 
 
   
In a few seconds the study 
items will begin
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APPENDIX 4 
 
nurse      taste 
sick      tooth 
lawyer      honey  
medicine     fizzy drink 
pills      chocolate 
bill      cookie 
hospital     heart 
dentist      cake 
patient      pie 
office      bed 
injection     rest 
surgeon     pillow 
note      awake 
sound      tired 
piano      dream 
sing      blanket 
radio      snore 
band      nap 
horn      deep 
concert      peace 
instrument     yawn 
jazz 
art 
orchestra 
table 
sit 
legs 
seat 
couch 
desk 
lazy-boy 
cushion 
sofa 
stool 
rocking 
bench 
hill 
valley 
climb 
slope 
cliff 
goat 
bike 
rock 
stream 
snow 
ski 
cave 
sour 
lollies 
sugar 
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APPENDIX 5 
 
 
 
 
“Haunted House Maze” 
 
 
Extracted from: 
Tyler, J., & Round, G. (1980). Picture puzzles. London: 
Usborne Publishing Ltd. 
 
Subjects were presented with an A3 greyscale version of 
the Maze, shown in A4 colour on the following page 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
 
 
 
i) Standard recall (picture condition) 
 
ii) Standard recall (word condition) 
 
iii) Inclusion recall (picture condition) 
 
iv) Inclusion recall (word condition) 
 
v) Specific recall (picture condition) 
 
vi) Specific recall (word condition) 
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i) 
 
 
On the piece of paper given to you, 
please write down as many of the 
words describing the pictures as you 
can  
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ii) 
 
 
On the piece of paper given to you, 
please write down as many of the 
words that were shown to you as you 
can 
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iii)  
 
 
On the piece of paper given to you, 
please write down as many of the 
words describing the pictures as you 
can  
 
Please also write down any words that 
you think of which are related to the 
pictures that you saw. For example, if 
you were shown a list of pictures such 
as shoe, sock, toe and you 
remembered a related word foot, you 
would write foot down also. 
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Now go through your list of words 
and place a tick next to the words 
which you think were shown to you 
on the computer screen 
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iv) 
 
 
On the piece of paper given to you, 
please write down as many of the 
words that were shown to you as you 
can.  
 
Please also write down any words that 
you think of which are related to the 
words that you saw. For example, if 
you were shown a list of words such 
as shoe, sock, toe and you 
remembered a related word foot, you 
would write foot down also.  
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Now go through your list of words 
and place a tick next to the words 
which you think were shown to you 
on the computer screen 
 
 
 
 108 
v) 
 
 
Please write down only the names 
of the pictures that you remember 
seeing come up on the computer 
screen. So for example, if you 
remembered seeing a picture of a 
bath 
  
you would write bath on your list 
and all the other pictures you 
remember seeing. 
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vi) 
 
 
Please write down only the names 
of the words that you remember 
seeing appear on your computer 
screen. So for example, if you 
remembered seeing the word 
bath 
you would write bath on your list 
and all the other words you 
remember seeing on the screen. 
 110 
 
APPENDIX 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ref: HEC 2005/30 
 
 
30 May 2005 
 
 
Marissa Blakeley 
Psychology 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
 
Dear Marissa Blakeley 
 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Do children use the 
same coding and retrieval mechanisms to reduce false memories as adults?  An exploration 
of the use of the impoverished-relational encoding and distinctiveness heuristic accounts in 
children” has been considered and approved. 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Catherine Moran 
Interim Chair 
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APPENDIX 8 
College of Science 
Department of Psychology 
 
Dear Parents / Guardians, 
 
My name is Marissa Blakeley and I am a psychology research student at the University of Canterbury, 
investigating the accuracy of memory.  My research study will involve children participating in a memory 
test. They will be shown a series of pictures or words and will then be given a memory test. There is no 
foreseen harm to the participants and the research will be conducted in school hours. It is not likely to 
take more than 40 minutes. Your child will be offered a sweet at the completion of the experiment.  I 
would very much appreciate it if you would allow your child to participate in this memory test. This 
research study is part of a Master of Science Thesis, through the Psychology Department of the 
University of Canterbury. If you have any queries or concerns about the project please do not hesitate 
to ask either myself (364 2987 ext 7988) or my supervisor, Dr Ewald Neumann on 364 2987 ext 6964. 
 
The results from the experiment will be held in the strictest confidence and only myself and my 
supervisor will have access to them. If published, the students’ information will remain confidential and 
anonymous. 
 
Participation in the study is entirely voluntary and if your child wishes to withdraw from the study at any 
time he or she may do so. Any information relating to him / her will also be withdrawn from the study at 
that time. This research project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
I have read and understood the above research project and I agree that data concerning my child’s 
response to the memory test may be used for the project. I consent to publication of the results with the 
understanding that my child’s anonymity will be preserved. 
 
I also understand that if I decide at a later date (before the publication of the experiment) that I am not 
content with this decision, I can withdraw from the project and the information that my child has 
provided will then be destroyed. 
 
NAME (please print):……………………………………………. 
 
CHILD’S NAME: …………………………………………………… 
 
CHILD’S CLASS……… 
 
Signature…………………………….. 
 
Date:……………………….. 
 
Please tick the box to indicate your preference for treat given at the end of the experiment: 
 
Small chocolate bar (15g)       No chocolate bar    □  
 
If ‘no’,  please suggest an alternative treat ........................................................... 
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APPENDIX 9 
College of Science 
Department of Psychology 
 
Dear Parents / Guardians, 
 
Thank you very much for allowing your child to participate in a study on children’s memory and the 
inaccuracy of memory. The main aim of this study was to determine whether children use the same 
memory mechanisms as adults to reduce false memories. Your child was presented with a number 
of pictures or words that were all related to a word that was not presented in the study items. For 
example, words were presented such as “sour”, “lollies” and “sugar” which were all related to the 
word “sweet”. When a child incorrectly remembers the word “sweet” it is noted as a false memory. 
 
This study extends our understanding of the ways that children remember pictures in comparison 
to words and gives us insight into the way that children can reduce false memories. 
 
Thank you again for assisting in this study. It is greatly appreciated. If you  have any questions 
regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact either myself or one of my supervisors 
below. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Marissa Blakeley 
 
Marissa Blakeley   Dr Ewald Neumann  Mr Paul Russell  
Department of Psychology      Department of Psychology Department Psychology 
University of Canterbury  University of Canterbury University of Canterbury 
Phone 364 2987 ext 7988  Phone 34 62987 ext 6964 Phone 364 2987 ext 6170 
 
 
 
